Belief-Policies Cannot Ground Doxastic Responsibility

Erkenntnis 78 (3):561-569 (2013)
Abstract
William Alston has provided a by now well-known objection to the deontological conception of epistemic justification by arguing that since we lack control over our beliefs, we are not responsible for them. It is widely acknowledged that if Alston’s argument is convincing, then it seems that the very idea of doxastic responsibility is in trouble. In this article, I attempt to refute one line of response to Alston’s argument. On this approach, we are responsible for our beliefs in virtue of the fact that we have certain belief-policies, that is, policies about what (not) to believe in certain circumstances. I present the advocate of this strategy with a dilemma: either belief-policies are themselves beliefs or they are not. If they are, then they are as involuntary as our other beliefs. If they are not, then they cannot make a difference to the beliefs we hold. I conclude that if we bear doxastic responsibility, it should not be explained in terms of our belief-policies
Keywords Belief-policies  Belief  Acceptance  Ethics of belief
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9384-5
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
An Essay on Belief and Acceptance.Cohen L. Jonathan - 1992 - New York: Clarendon Press.
Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.
Belief Control and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.

View all 19 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief.Anthony Robert Booth & Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
A New Rejection of Doxastic Voluntarism.Sergi Rosell - 2009 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):97-112.
The Epistemology of Belief.Hamid Vahid - 2009 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence.Danny Frederick - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44.
The Virtues of Belief: Toward a Non-Evidentialist Ethics of Belief-Formation. [REVIEW]Richard Amesbury - 2008 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 63 (1/3):25 - 37.

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2012-06-22

Total downloads

152 ( #29,788 of 2,153,861 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

19 ( #21,569 of 2,153,861 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums