Abstract

When we are asked what the term ‘Socrates’ signifies, we answer spontaneously, I suppose: “the man Socrates.” And when we are asked what the term ‘white’ signifies, we tend to answer: “the color white” or “whiteness.” Although our second answer may be less spontaneous than the first, either because we may have some difficulty in explaining what a color is, ontologically speaking, or because we may be reluctant to commit ourselves to such a controversial thing as whiteness, we may nevertheless be willing to grant that ‘white’ signifies something, however this thing is to be explained in detail. But when we are asked what ‘Socrates is white’ signifies, we might hesitate in giving an answer. Some may say: “Well, this sentence signifies nothing other than Socrates and the color white.” Others may respond: “It signifies Socrates insofar as he is white” or “the fact that Socrates is white.” Still others may reply that there is no answer because only terms signify something; a sentence, on the other hand, does not signify but expresses something or brings something to the understanding.