An Explanatory Virtue for Endurantist Presentism

Philosophia 47 (1):157-182 (2019)
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Abstract

This essay outlines an explanatory virtue of presentism: its unique ability amongst temporal metaphysics to deliver a partial explanation of the conservational character of natural laws. That explanation relies on presentism, uniquely amongst temporal metaphysics, being able to support an endurantist account of persistence. In particular, after reconsidering a former argument for endurantism entailing presentism by Merricks (Noûs 33:421-438, 1999), a new argument for this entailment, is expounded. Before delivering the explanation of the conservational character of natural laws, a brief account of that explanandum is given, followed by an elaboration of the wider significance of an explanation for the conservational character for natural laws, particularly for the dispositional essentialist project of nomic reductionism, and explaining the non-simultaneity of causation.

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Citations of this work

Temporal Parts.Katherine Hawley - 2004/2010 - Stanford Encylopedia of Philosophy.
Duration Enough for Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):391-421.
Duration Enough for Presentism.Robert E. Pezet - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (4):391-421.

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Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.

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