The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism


Authors
Gualtiero Piccinini
University of Missouri, St. Louis
Abstract
Defending or attacking either functionalism or computationalism requires clarity on what they amount to and what evidence counts for or against them. My goalhere is not to evaluatc their plausibility. My goal is to formulate them and their relationship clearly enough that we can determine which type of evidence is relevant to them. I aim to dispel some sources of confusion that surround functionalism and computationalism. recruit recent philosophical work on mechanisms and computation to shed light on them, and clarify how functionalism and computationalism mayor may not legitimately come together.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205  
DOI ppr201081261
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References found in this work BETA

Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Unified Theories of Cognition.Allen Newell - 1990 - Harvard University Press.
Brainstorms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - MIT Press.
The Sciences of the Artificial.Herbert A. Simon - 1969 - [Cambridge, M.I.T. Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Functional Sense of Mechanism.Justin Garson - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (3):317-333.
The Functional Unity of Special Science Kinds.D. A. Weiskopf - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (2):233-258.

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