Thin Objects Are Not Transparent

Theoria 89 (3):314-325 (2023)
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Abstract

In this short paper, we analyse whether assuming that mathematical objects are “thin” in Linnebo's sense simplifies the epistemology of mathematics. Towards this end, we introduce the notion of transparency and show that not all thin objects are transparent. We end by arguing that, far from being a weakness of thin objects, the lack of transparency of some thin objects is a fruitful characteristic mark of abstract mathematics.

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Author Profiles

Matteo Plebani
Università Degli Studi Di Torino
Luca San Mauro
Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza
Giorgio Venturi
University of Campinas

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References found in this work

Truth and other enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.
Frege's conception of numbers as objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - [Aberdeen]: Aberdeen University Press.
Frege’s Conception of Numbers as Objects.Crispin Wright - 1983 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
Truth and Other Enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 32 (4):419-425.

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