Does metacognition necessarily involve metarepresentation?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):352-352 (2003)
Authors
Joëlle Proust
Institut Jean Nicod
Abstract
Against the view that metacognition is a capacity that parallels theory of mind, it is argued that metacognition need involve neither metarepresentation nor semantic forms of reflexivity, but only process-reflexivity, through which a task-specific system monitors its own internal feedback by using quantitative cues. Metacognitive activities, however, may be redescribed in metarepresentational, mentalistic terms in species endowed with a theory of mind.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X0336008X
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