Philosophy of Science 59 (3):498-507 (1992)
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This discussion adjudicates a dispute between Larry Laudan and Gerald Doppelt over the nature of methodological rules. Laudan holds that all methodological rules are hypothetical imperatives, while Doppelt argues that a subset of those rules, basic methodological standards, are not hypothetical imperatives. I argue that neither writer offers a satisfactory account of methodological rules and that their reliance on the hypothetical/nonhypothetical distinction does not advance our understanding of methodological rules. I propose that we dispense with this dubious distinction and develop an alternative account of scientific norms
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DOI | 10.1086/289688 |
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The Limits of Self-Effacement: A Reply to Wittwer.Patrick Clipsham - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-20.
Confirmation Theory and Moral Justification.Edward D. Sherline - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (2-3):225 - 238.
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