The philosophical case for open theism

Philosophia 35 (3-4):301-311 (2007)
Abstract
The goal of this paper is to defend open theism vis-à-vis its main competitors within the family of broadly classical theisms, namely, theological determinism and the various forms of non-open free-will theism, such as Molinism and Ockhamism. After isolating two core theses over which open theists and their opponents differ, I argue for the open theist position on both points. Specifically, I argue against theological determinists that there are future contingents. And I argue against non-open free-will theists that future contingency is incompatible with the future’s being epistemically settled for God. This paper is a follow-up to the author’s Rhoda (Religious Studies, 2008) which was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.
Keywords open theism  Molinism  Ockhamism  classical theism  free-will theism  future contingents
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11406-007-9078-4
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,396
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Papers on Time and Tense.A. N. Prior - 1968 - Oxford University Press.
Providence, Evil and the Openness of God.William Hasker - 2008 - Faith and Philosophy 25 (3):350-356.
God, Time and Knowledge.William Hasker - 1989 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
123 ( #44,831 of 2,225,993 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #44,521 of 2,225,993 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature