Abstract

The author explores Aristotle’s theory of signification by contrasting it to Plato’s theory of language, which is interpreted, rather uncritically, as a theory of "natural" signification. She discusses Aristotle’s position on the meaning of sentences and sentential parts, and his theory of reference. She then considers Aristotle’s concept of philosophical language as the language of demonstration, in contrast to the saying of myths, and compares apodeixis to rhetoric and poetry. "Clarity" is required in philosophical discourse, and is defined by contrast with equivocation, ambiguity and metaphor. It is good to have a collection of Aristotle’s remarks on these important items, but the author seems not to draw much philosophical capital from them: "clarity" seems to be taken as little more than "careful writing." Finally some passages from the Metaphysics are examined to give an example of how Aristotle uses language in philosophy. The book contains interesting remarks, but the general problem seems misplaced: we are to be shown that Aristotle is "not concerned solely with linguistic clarification but with positive knowledge of nonlinguistic reality", but such a dichotomy is certainly not Aristotelian. Neither is the problem raised in this sentence, "It is difficult to say whether Aristotle thinks men are social because they have the power of speech or the converse". Again, the author says "poetry is the imitation of things" when she means tragedy is the imitation of action.—R. S.