Adaptivity and self-knowledge

Inquiry 18 (1):1-22 (1975)
In this paper the view is presented that self?knowledge has no special status; its varieties constitute distinctive classes, differing from one another more sharply than each does from analogous knowledge of others. Most cases of self?knowledge are best understood contextually, subsumed under such other activities as decision?making and socializing. First person, present tense ?reports? of sensations, intentions, and thoughts are primarily adaptively expressive, only secondarily truth?functional. The last section sketches some of the disadvantages, as well as some of the advantages, of being the sort of animal that is capable of treating itself as an object, to be known as others are known
Keywords Epistemology  Feeling  Intention  Knowing  Self-knowledge  Thought  Want
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201747508601747
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,664
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
William P. Alston (1971). Varieties of Priveleged Access. American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

18 ( #254,180 of 1,903,037 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

1 ( #446,009 of 1,903,037 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.