Inquiry 18 (1):1-22 (1975)
In this paper the view is presented that self?knowledge has no special status; its varieties constitute distinctive classes, differing from one another more sharply than each does from analogous knowledge of others. Most cases of self?knowledge are best understood contextually, subsumed under such other activities as decision?making and socializing. First person, present tense ?reports? of sensations, intentions, and thoughts are primarily adaptively expressive, only secondarily truth?functional. The last section sketches some of the disadvantages, as well as some of the advantages, of being the sort of animal that is capable of treating itself as an object, to be known as others are known
|Keywords||Epistemology Feeling Intention Knowing Self-knowledge Thought Want|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Varieties of Priveleged Access.William P. Alston - 1971 - American Philosophical Quarterly 8 (July):223-41.
Citations of this work BETA
“Take Away the Life-Lie … “: Positive Illusions and Creative Self-Deception.David A. Jopling - 1996 - Philosophical Psychology 9 (4):525 – 544.
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