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Profile: Terry Horgan (University of Arizona, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
  1. Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2008 - MIT Press.
     
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  2.  78
    Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Metaethics, understood as a distinct branch of ethics, is often traced to G. E. Moore's 1903 classic, Principia Ethica. Whereas normative ethics is concerned to answer first order moral questions about what is good and bad, right and wrong, metaethics is concerned to answer second order non-moral questions about the semantics, metaphysics, and epistemology of moral thought and discourse. Moore has continued to exert a powerful influence, and the sixteen essays here represent the most up-to-date work in metaethics after, and (...)
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  3. Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Consciousness That We May Know It so Well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.
    It has often been thought that our knowledge of ourselves is _different_ from, perhaps in some sense _better_ than, our knowledge of things other than ourselves. Indeed, there is a thriving research area in epistemology dedicated to seeking an account of self-knowledge that would articulate and explain its difference from, and superiority over, other knowledge. Such an account would thus illuminate the descriptive and normative difference between self-knowledge and other knowledge.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, self- knowledge has also encountered its (...)
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  4. Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day.Terry Horgan - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):10–21.
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  5. Cognitivist Expressivism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2006 - In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. pp. 255--298.
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  6. Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy.Terry Horgan & George Graham - 2012 - In Richard Schantz (ed.), Prospects for Meaning. De Gruyter.
  7. Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2000 - Facta Philosophica 2:249-270.
  8. Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):279-295.
    According to rationalism regarding the psychology of moral judgment, people’s moral judgments are generally the result of a process of reasoning that relies on moral principles or rules. By contrast, intuitionist models of moral judgment hold that people generally come to have moral judgments about particular cases on the basis of gut-level, emotion-driven intuition, and do so without reliance on reasoning and hence without reliance on moral principles. In recent years the intuitionist model has been forcefully defended by Jonathan Haidt. (...)
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  9.  55
    Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Analysis 67 (293):50–59.
  10. Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2005 - Philosophical Issues 15 (1):56–77.
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  11. Untying a Knot From the Inside Out: Reflections on the “Paradox” of Supererogation.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):29-63.
    In his 1958 seminal paper “Saints and Heroes”, J. O. Urmson argued that the then dominant tripartite deontic scheme of classifying actions as being exclusively either obligatory, or optional in the sense of being morally indifferent, or wrong, ought to be expanded to include the category of the supererogatory. Colloquially, this category includes actions that are “beyond the call of duty” (beyond what is obligatory) and hence actions that one has no duty or obligation to perform. But it is a (...)
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  12.  41
    From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed.Terry Horgan - 2011 - In Tim Bayne and Michelle Montague (ed.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. pp. 57.
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  13. What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us About Moral Objectivity?Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2008 - Social Philosophy and Policy 25 (1):267-300.
    Moral phenomenology is concerned with the elements of one's moral experiences that are generally available to introspection. Some philosophers argue that one's moral experiences, such as experiencing oneself as being morally obligated to perform some action on some occasion, contain elements that (1) are available to introspection and (2) carry ontological objectivist purportargument from phenomenological introspection.neutrality thesisthe phenomenological data regarding one's moral experiences that is available to introspection is neutral with respect to the issue of whether such experiences carry ontological (...)
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  14. Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2000 - Synthese 124 (1-2):139-152.
    In "Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth", David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around our Moral Twin Earth argument. Copp nicely brings out the force of our argument, not only through his exposition of it, but through his attempt to defeat it, since his efforts, we think, only help to make manifest the deep difficulties the Moral Twin Earth argument poses for the synthetic moral naturalist.
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  15. Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):74-96.
    Is conceptual relativity a genuine phenomenon? If so, how is it properly understood? And if it does occur, does it undermine metaphysical realism? These are the questions we propose to address. We will argue that conceptual relativity is indeed a genuine phenomenon, albeit an extremely puzzling one. We will offer an account of it. And we will argue that it is entirely compatible with metaphysical realism. Metaphysical realism is the view that there is a world of objects and properties that (...)
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    What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity?Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (1):25-51.
    Within cognitive science, mental processing is often construed as computation over mental representations—i.e., as the manipulation and transformation of mental representations in accordance with rules of the kind expressible in the form of a computer program. This foundational approach has encountered a long-standing, persistently recalcitrant, problem often called the frame problem; it is sometimes called the relevance problem. In this paper we describe the frame problem and certain of its apparent morals concerning human cognition, and we argue that these morals (...)
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  17.  81
    Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2000 - Philosophical Papers 29 (2):121-153.
    Abstract We propose a metaethical view that combines the cognitivist idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs and moral utterances express genuine assertions with the idea that such beliefs and utterances are nondescriptive in their overall content. This sort of view has not been recognized among the standard metaethical options because it is generally assumed that all genuine beliefs and assertions must have descriptive content. We challenge this assumption and thereby open up conceptual space for a new kind of metaethical (...)
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  18.  65
    Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness.Terry Horgan - 1995 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):97-126.
    I advocate a two part view concerning vagueness. On one hand I claim that vagueness is logically incoherent; but on the other hand I claim that vagueness is also a benign, beneficial, and indeed essential feature of human language and thought. I will call this view transvaluationism, a name which seems to me appropriate for several reasons. First, the term suggests that we should move beyond the idea that the successive statements in a sorites sequence can be assigned differing truth (...)
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  19. Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2012 - In Philip Goff (ed.), Spinoza on Monism. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 51--76.
     
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  20. The A Priori Isn’T All That It Is Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2001 - Philosophical Topics 29 (1/2):219-250.
    Alvin Goldman’s contributions to contemporary epistemology are impressive—few epistemologists have provided others so many occasions for reflecting on the fundamental character of their discipline and its concepts. His work has informed the way epistemological questions have changed (and remained consistent) over the last two decades. We (the authors of this paper) can perhaps best suggest our indebtedness by noting that there is probably no paper on epistemology that either of us individually or jointly have produced that does not in its (...)
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  21. Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism.David Henderson & Terry Horgan - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 100.
     
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  22.  22
    Introspection About Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut From Infallibility to Impotence.Terry Horgan - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  23.  52
    Transvaluationism.Terry Horgan - 2006 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 14 (1):20-35.
    I advocate a two part view concerning vagueness. On one hand I claim that vagueness is logically incoherent; but on the other hand I claim that vagueness is also a benign, beneficial, and indeed essential feature of human language and thought. I will call this view transvaluationism, a name which seems to me appropriate for several reasons. First, the term suggests that we should move beyond the idea that the successive statements in a sorites sequence can be assigned differing truth (...)
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  24.  75
    Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust.Terry Horgan - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):155-159.
    I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an (...)
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  25.  48
    The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (2):155-173.
    Morphological content is information that is implicitly embodied in the standing structure of a cognitive system and is automatically accommodated during cognitive processing without first becoming explicit in consciousness. We maintain that much belief-formation in human cognition is essentially morphological : i.e., it draws heavily on large amounts of morphological content, and must do so in order to tractably accommodate the holistic evidential relevance of background information possessed by the cognitive agent. We also advocate a form of experiential evidentialism concerning (...)
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  26. The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons From Introspection and Lessons From Its Limits.Terry Horgan - 2011 - Humana. Mente 15:77-97.
     
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  27. Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (1):115-131.
    Moral phenomenology is (roughly) the study of those features of occurrent mental states with moral significance which are accessible through direct introspection, whether or not such states possess phenomenal character – a what-it-is-likeness. In this paper, as the title indicates, we introduce and make prefatory remarks about moral phenomenology and its significance for ethics. After providing a brief taxonomy of types of moral experience, we proceed to consider questions about the commonality within and distinctiveness of such experiences, with an eye (...)
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  28.  38
    A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis.Mark Balaguer & Terry Horgan - 2016 - Analysis 76 (1):3-7.
    The paradox of analysis asks how a putative conceptual analysis can be both true and informative. If it is true then isn’t it analytic? And if it is analytic then how can it be informative? Our proposed solution rests on a distinction between explicit knowledge of meaning and implicit knowledge of meaning and on a correlative distinction between two kinds of conceptual competence. If one initially possesses only implicit knowledge of the meaning of a given concept and the associated linguistic (...)
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  29. Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - In Ian Ravenscroft (ed.), Minds, Ethics, and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson. Oxford University Press.
    In Chapters 4 and 5 of his 1998 book From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis, Frank Jackson propounds and defends a form of moral realism that he calls both ‘moral functionalism’ and ‘analytical descriptivism’. Here we argue that this metaethical position, which we will henceforth call ‘analytical moral functionalism’, is untenable. We do so by applying a generic thought-experimental deconstructive recipe that we have used before against other views that posit moral properties and identify them with certain (...)
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  30.  84
    Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism.David Henderson, Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (4):281-300.
    We propose an approach to epistemic justification that incorporates elements of both reliabilism and evidentialism, while also transforming these elements in significant ways. After briefly describing and motivating the non-standard version of reliabilism that Henderson and Horgan call “transglobal” reliabilism, we harness some of Henderson and Horgan’s conceptual machinery to provide a non-reliabilist account of propositional justification (i.e., evidential support). We then invoke this account, together with the notion of a transglobally reliable belief-forming process, to give an account of doxastic (...)
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  31. The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency.Terry Horgan & John Tienson - unknown
    For the last 20 years or so, philosophers of mind have been using the term ‘qualia’, which is frequently glossed as standing for the “what-it-is-like” of experience. The examples of what-it-is-like that are typically given are feelings of pain or itches, and color and sound sensations. This suggests an identification of the experiential what-it-islike with such states. More recently, philosophers have begun speaking of the “phenomenology“ of experience, which they have also glossed as “what-it-is-like”. Many say, for example, that any (...)
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  32.  76
    Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 4:180 - 204.
  33.  55
    Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem?Terry Horgan - 2001 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 16 (40):95-116.
    Causal compatibilism claims that even though physics is causally closed, and even though mental properties are multiply realizable and are not identical to physical causal properties, mental properties are causal properties nonetheless. This position asserts that there is genuine causation at multiple descriptive/ontological levels; physics-level causal claims are not really incompatible with mentalistic causal claims. I articulate and defend a version of causal compatibilism that incorporates three key contentions. First, causation crucially involves robust patterns of counterfactual dependence among properties.Second, often (...)
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  34.  70
    Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):92-112.
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  35.  36
    The Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality of Probability.Terry Horgan - 2000 - Noûs 34 (4):578–603.
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  36. Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem.Terry Horgan & Anna Mahtani - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (2):333-351.
    We present a new argument for the claim that in the Sleeping Beauty problem, the probability that the coin comes up heads is 1/3. Our argument depends on a principle for the updating of probabilities that we call ‘generalized conditionalization’, and on a species of generalized conditionalization we call ‘synchronic conditionalization on old information’. We set forth a rationale for the legitimacy of generalized conditionalization, and we explain why our new argument for thirdism is immune to two attacks that Pust (...)
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  37.  30
    From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1996 - Critica 28 (83):3 - 39.
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  38. The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Phenomenology.Terry Horgan & John Tienson - 2002 - In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. pp. 520--533.
     
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  39.  51
    Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:73-98.
  40. Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Psyche 13.
    I explore the prospects for overcoming the prima facie tension in the following four claims, all of which I accept: the phenomenal character of experience is narrow; virtually all aspects of the phenomenal character of experience are intentional; the most fundamental kind of mental intentionality is fully constituted by phenomenal character; and yet introspection does not by itself reliably generate answers to certain philosophically important questions about the phenomenally constituted intentional content of experience. The apparent tension results from the following (...)
     
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  41.  40
    Morality Without Moral Facts.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2006 - In James Lawrence Dreier (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell. pp. 6--220.
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  42.  33
    Particularist Semantic Normativity.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (1):45-61.
    We sketch the view we call contextual semantics. It asserts that truth is semantically correct affirmability under contextually variable semantic standards, that truth is frequently an indirect form of correspondence between thought/language and the world, and that many Quinean commitments are not genuine ontological commitments. We argue that contextualist semantics fits very naturally with the view that the pertinent semantic standards are particularist rather than being systematizable as exceptionless general principles.
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  43.  15
    Newcomb's Problem Revisited.Terry Horgan - 2015 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 22:4-15.
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  44.  52
    Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: A Reply to Sonderholm.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2015 - Theoria 81 (4):355-375.
    In his 2013 Theoria article, “Unreliable Intuitions: A New Reply to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument,” Jorn Sonderholm attempts to undermine our moral twin earth argument against Richard Boyd's moral semantics by debunking the semantic intuitions that are prompted by reflection on the thought experiment featured in the MTE argument. We divide our reply into three main sections. In section 1, we briefly review Boyd's moral semantics and our MTE argument against this view. In section 2, we set forth what we (...)
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  45. Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 2010 - In Ian Verstegen (ed.), Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism. Routledge. pp. 105.
     
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  46. Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism.Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč - 2002 - Facta Philosophica 4:311-322.
     
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  47.  44
    Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons - 1996 - Philosophical Papers 25 (3):203-231.
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  48.  78
    Transvaluationism About Vagueness: A Progress Report.Terry Horgan - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):67-94.
    The philosophical account of vagueness I call "transvaluationism" makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought-content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phenomenon despite possessing this form of incoherence—and is viable, legitimate, and indeed indispensable. Third, vagueness as a feature of objects, properties, or relations (i.e., ontological vagueness) is impossible, because of (...)
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  49.  9
    Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy.George Graham & Terry Horgan - 1994 - Philosophical Issues 5:219 - 247.
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  50. Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem.Terry Horgan - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):183-200.
    The hypothesis of the mental state-causation of behavior asserts that the behaviors we classify as actions are caused by certain mental states. A principal reason often given for trying to secure the truth of the MSC hypothesis is that doing so is allegedly required to vindicate our belief in our own agency. I argue that the project of vindicating agency needs to be seriously reconceived, as does the relation between this project and the MSC hypothesis. Vindication requires addressing what I (...)
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