Descartes's case for dualism

Descartes's dualism, and his argument for it, are often understood in terms of the modal notion of separability. I argue that the central notions, substance and real distinction, should not be understood this way. Descartes's well-known argument for dualism relies implicitly on views he spells out in the Principles of Philosophy, where he explains that a substance has a nature that consists in a single attribute, and all its qualities are modes of that nature. The argument relies ultimately on a deeply rationalistic view of substance.
Keywords Descartes  mind-body dualism  substance  real distinction
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DOI 10.1353/hph.1995.0000
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