Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters

Philosophia (forthcoming)

Abstract

This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) remarks on moral matters.

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