Akrasia and the Desire to Become Someone Else: Venturinha on Moral Matters

Philosophia (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper discusses practical akrasia from the perspective of the sophisticated form of moral subjectivism that can be derived from Nuno Venturinha’s (2018) remarks on moral matters.

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Venturinha and Epistemic Vertigo.Duncan Pritchard - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1699-1704.
Huckleberry FInn Revisited: Inverse Akrasia and Moral Ignorance".Arpaly Nomy - 2015 - In Michael Mckenna Randolph Clarcke & Smith Angela M. (eds.), The Nature of Moral Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 141-156.
Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning.Byron J. Stoyles - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):195-207.
Nuno Venturinha, Description of Situations: An Essay in Contextualist Epistemology. [REVIEW]Robin McKenna - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (2):188-192.
The Indispensability of Knowledge.Michael Williams - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1691-1697.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-01-03

Downloads
363 (#58,249)

6 months
82 (#69,299)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Javier González De Prado Salas
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references