IF first-order logic and truth-definitions

Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1997)
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Abstract

This paper shows that the logic known as Information-friendly logic (IF-logic) introduced by Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu defines its own truth-predicate. The result is interesting given that IF logic is a much stronger logic than ordinary first-order logic and has also a well behaved notion of negation which, on its first-order subfragment, behaves like classical, contradictory negation.

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