On the choice of obtaining and disclosing the common value in auctions

Artificial Intelligence 215 (C):24-54 (2014)
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Optimal auctions revisited.Dov Monderer & Moshe Tennenholtz - 2000 - Artificial Intelligence 120 (1):29-42.
Tractable combinatorial auctions and b-matching.Moshe Tennenholtz - 2002 - Artificial Intelligence 140 (1-2):231-243.

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