Weakness of will in Aristotle's ethics

Southern Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):375-382 (1986)
I argue that in "en", Aristotle allows not only for weak akrasia but also for "strong akrasia". In weak akrasia, The agent makes only a "nominal" choice according to the right principle, While in strong akrasia he/she makes a "real" choice, But still acts against it. I show that, Although aristotle does not give a detailed account of strong akrasia, Such an account can be reconstructed on the basis of the analyses and examples of choice and akratic behaviour provided by him in "en" and "de motu"
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1986.tb01574.x
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 24,470
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

38 ( #126,984 of 1,925,574 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

3 ( #254,998 of 1,925,574 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.