Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):225 - 233 (1978)
I argue that (a) the causal theory of proper names and (b) Kripke's chain of references thesis are logically independent of each other, and that the case for (a) is very weak. I observe that rejecting (a) we lose one powerful reason for treating proper names as rigid designators. I then consider reasons for subscribing to (b), and I argue that (b) is compatible with either a rigid or a non-rigid (descriptive) semantic treatment of proper names.
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References found in this work BETA
The Causal Theory of Names.Gareth Evans - 1973 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 47 (1):187–208.
Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re.Ernest Sosa - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 67 (21):883-896.
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