Abstract

In his 1647 Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, Descartes responded to the view of Henricus Regius that all thought is derived from sensation by making two claims: first, that even sensory ideas are broadly innate since they are produced by a mental faculty, and second, that certain notions are more narrowly innate because they cannot be derived from sense experience. Part One of my dissertation examines issues pertaining to the first claim against Regius. In Chapter 1, I contend that Descartes' argument in the Comments for his account of the origin of sensory ideas derives from a response to scholastic accounts of sensation found thoughout his writings. By setting this argument in its historical context, I also show that it is inadequate. In Chapter 2, I turn to elements of Descartes' mature thought that provide better support for the appeal to a faculty of mind that forms sensations. By examining his discussions of corporeal interaction, along with those of his successors, I reveal that Descartes is committed to the view that bodies cannot possess any powers, including the power to produce sensory states of mind. I also claim that his system allows for the mind to produce sensory ideas. ;Part Two considers Descartes' second claim against Regius. In Chapter 3, I discuss the view of the Comments that certain notions are narrowly innate in the genetic sense of being produced by mind without the aid of sense experience. I hold that this sort of derivation cannot be central for Descartes, since it does not allow for his view that notions of geometrical figures are both innate and formed by means of abstraction from materials supplied by sense experience. In Chapter 4, I contend that a close reading of Descartes' discussion of geometrical essences reveals an epistemic sense of innateness, according to which the mind possesses an intellectual power to discover notions vital for knowledge that cannot be supported by sense experience. I conclude by arguing that this sense of innateness best illumines Descartes' claim in the Meditations that the notion of the self and God are innate