Antonia Lolordo presents an original interpretation of John Locke's metaphysics of moral agency, in which to be a moral agent is simply to be free, rational, and a person.

In several early 19th century works, Mary Shepherd articulates a theory of causation that is intended to respond to Humean skepticism. I argue that Shepherd's theory should be read in light of the science of the day and her conception of her place in the British philosophical tradition. Reading Shepherd’s theory in light of her conception of the history of philosophy, including her claim to be the genuine heir of Locke, illuminates the broader significance of her attempt to reinstate reason (...) as the source of scientific knowledge. Reading Shepherd's theory in light of the science of the day helps make plausible her claim that there are robust natural kinds in nature, defined by their causal powers: this is precisely what then-recent advances in chemistry hold. (shrink)

This book offers a comprehensive treatment of the philosophical system of the seventeenth-century philosopher Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi's importance is widely recognized and is essential for understanding early modern philosophers and scientists such as Locke, Leibniz and Newton. Offering a systematic overview of his contributions, LoLordo situates Gassendi's views within the context of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century natural philosophy as represented by a variety of intellectual traditions, including scholastic Aristotelianism, Renaissance Neo-Platonism, and the emerging mechanical philosophy. LoLordo's work will be essential (...) reading for historians of early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)

This is the first modern edition of an important work by a previously neglected early 19th century woman philosopher, Mary Shepherd. Shepherd develops a distinctive philosophical system that can be seen as a competitor to Kant's Transcendental Idealism. The edition is aimed at researchers in early modern philosophy and is also intended to be used in graduate and undergraduate courses. It contains a concise introduction as guide for the reader.

Locke claims that we have sensitive knowledge of the external world, in virtue of the fact that simple ideas are real, true, and adequate. However, despite his dismissive remarks about Cartesian external-world skepticism, Locke gives us little to go on as to how knowledge of the external world survives the fact of perceptual error, or even how perceptual error is possible. I argue that Locke has an in-principle problem explaining perceptual error.

ABSTRACT. In his Letters on the motion impressed by a moving mover, Gassendi offers a theory of the motion of composite bodies that closely follows Galileo’s. Elsewhere, he describes the motion of individual atoms in very different terms: individual atoms are always in motion, even when the body that contains them is at rest; atomic motion is discontinuous although the motion of composite bodies is at least apparently continuous; and atomic motion is grounded in an intrinsic vis motrix, motive power, (...) while composite bodies simply persist in their state of motion or rest in the absence of outside intereference. Gassendi does not make much effort to explain how his accounts of atomic and composite motion fit together, and it’s difficult to see how they could possible be integrated. My goal is to explain, given this difficulty, why he accepted both the Galilean theory of the motion of composite bodies and the Epicurean theory of atomic motion. (shrink)

This paper gives three arguments for why Lockean persons must be modes rather than substances.

Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses provides an in-depth, engaging introduction to important issues in modern philosophy. It presents 13 key interpretive debates to students, and ranges in coverage from Descartes' Meditations to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. -/- Debates include: -/- Did Descartes have a developed and consistent view about how the mind interacts with the body? Was Leibniz an idealist, or did he believe in corporeal substances? What is Locke's theory of personal identity? Could there (...) be a Berkeleian metaphysics without God? Did Hume believe in causal powers? What is Kant's transcendental idealism? -/- Each of the thirteen debates consists of a well known article or book chapter from a living philosopher, followed by a new response from a different scholar, specially commissioned for this volume. Every debate is prefaced by an introduction written for those coming upon the debates for the first time and followed by an annotated list for further reading. The volume starts with an introduction that explains the importance and relevance of the modern period and its key debates to philosophy and ends with a glossary that covers terms from both the modern period and the study of the history of philosophy in general. -/- Debates in Modern Philosophy will help students evaluate different interpretations of key texts from modern philosophy, and provide a model for constructing their own positions in these debates. (shrink)

This is a review of Stephen Gaukroger's book Descartes's System of Natural Philosophy.

It is often suggested that certain forms of early modern philosophy are naturalistic. Although I have some sympathy with this description, I argue that applying the category of naturalism to early modern philosophy is not useful. There is another category that does most of the work we want the category of naturalism to do ? one that, unlike naturalism, was actually used by early moderns.

This is a review of Roger Woolhouse's biography of Locke.

This is my response to Sam Rickless's review article on my book, Locke's Moral Man.

Gassendi holds that matter is intrinsically active - it possesses an innate active force or power. This paper explains what that active power consists in and why Gassendi adopted this view.

: Malebranche famously objects to Descartes' argument that the nature of the mind is better known than the nature of body as follows: if we had an idea of the mind's nature we would know the possible range of modes of the mind, including the sensory modes, but we do not know those modes and thus can't have an idea of the mind's nature. I argue that Malebranche's objections are readily answerable from within the Cartesian system. This argument involves examining (...) the status of sensations in Descartes, innate ideas, and Malebranche's occasionalism. (shrink)

This paper attempts to reconstruct Hume's argument in Treatise 1.4.1, 'Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason'.

This is about Gassendi's 5th Objections to the Meditations and Descartes' Reply. The main issue is what clear and distinct perception consists in and whether we need a criterion in order to know if we perceive something clearly and distinctly.

Gassendi and Hobbes knew each other, and their approaches to philosophy often seem similar. They both criticized the Cartesian epistemology of clear and distinct perception. Gassendi engaged at length with skepticism, and also rejected the Aristotelian notion of scientia, arguing instead for a probabilistic view that shows us how we can move on in the absence of certain and evident knowledge. Hobbes, in contrast, retained the notion of scientia, which is the best sort of knowledge and involves causal explanation. He (...) thought, however, that this sort of knowledge was only available in geometry and political philosophy. (shrink)

We look at some interesting and important episodes in the life of early modern Epicureanism, focusing on natural philosophy. We begin with two early moderns who had a great deal to say about ancient Epicureanism: Pierre Gassendi and Ralph Cudworth. Looking at how Gassendi and Cudworth conceived of Epicureanism gives us a sense of what the early moderns considered important in the ancient tradition. It also points us towards three main themes of early modern Epicureanism in natural philosophy, which we (...) then discuss at greater length: atomism, materialism about the mind or soul, and the denial of providence, which was often accompanied by deflationary explanations of religious belief. (shrink)

This paper discusses how Gassendi and other 17th century atomists treated the distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal parts; (...) he concludes that nothing persists. (shrink)

This paper argues that Locke cannot provide a satisfactory account of perceptual error.

The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal parts; (...) he concludes that nothing persists. (shrink)

Gassendi holds both that we only have ideas of material things and that we know – by faith and, at least in later works, by reason as well – that the mind is immaterial. I examine the account of the mind provided in Gassendi’s Objections to the Meditations and show how Gassendi’s two theses can be rendered compatible. Indeed, the two theses, taken together, exemplify Gassendi’s account of the scope and limits of human understanding.

This article discusses Galen Strawson's Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment, and Udo Thiel's The Early Modern Subject.

Review of Deborah's Boyle's Lady Mary Shepherd: Selected Writings.

Antonia LoLordo - Malebranche - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 124-125 Andrew Pyle. Malebranche. London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. xiii + 289. Cloth, $80.00. Despite Malebranche's widely recognized importance, no comprehensive overview of his system was available before Pyle's excellent and wide-ranging study. Pyle agrees with scholarly consensus that occasionalism and the vision in God are Malebranche's two most significant doctrines, but his scope extends well beyond those to matters of theology, physics (...) and biology. In the first half of the book, Pyle lays out Malebranche's two key doctrines as responses to tensions within the Cartesian accounts of causation and of ideas. He details how Malebranche's theory of ideas is involved.. (shrink)

In the first edition of the Essay, Locke argued that we pursue whatever course of action we judge to be the best option available to us at the time. In other words, we always act under the guise of...

This is a review of Tad Schmaltz, Efficient Causation: A History.

Vignettes of early modern Epicureanism Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9566-9 Authors Antonia LoLordo, Department of Philosophy, 122 Cocke Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

The 17th century's new science and new philosophy was roughly equally divided between Cartesians and Gassendists. Scholars agree that understanding Gassendi's metaphysics, epistemology and scientific method is crucial for understanding the development of modern philosophy, as Gassendis version of Epicureanism provides a third strand of influence on modern philosophy paralleling Cartesianism and scholasticism. Despite this, Gassendi is rather little understood today. I look at Gassendi in the context of his Objections and Counter-Objections to the Meditations, along with Descartes' Replies. This (...) context provides an explicit display of the opposition between two main strands of the new philosophy. I argue---contra a popular characterization of Gassendi's thought as primarily skeptical or even wholly unsystematic---that Gassendi's objections derive from a systematic psychology and cannot be well understood without a grasp of this psychology. ;I begin with a central methodological question in the dispute, the status of clear and distinct perception and what this tells us about proper procedure. This disagreement has it source in competing accounts of the cognitive faculties. Hence I go on to develop an account of Gassendi's theory of the cognitive faculties, and in particular perception, the acquisition of ideas, and reasoning. I then examine Gassendi's initially rather puzzling objections to the cogito, which act as a test-case for my interpretation of Gassendi's theory of cognition. I end with the dispute over the mind-body relationship. Gassendi objects that Descartes has failed to give any more than a nominal definition of the mind, having failed to make intelligible the modes of the mind in terms of its essence. Gassendi, in contrast, seeks an account of the operations of the mind in terms of the micro-level structure of the parts of the brain, and understands this micro-level structure as the genuine essence of the mind. This objection provides an excellent case for examining how Descartes and Gassendi's rival psychologies influenced two very different notions of scientific method. (shrink)

There has recently been a resurgence of interest in the early nineteenth century Scottish philosopher Mary Shepherd. This Element is intended to provide an overview of Shepherd's system, including her views on the following wide range of topics: causation, induction, knowledge of the external world, matter, life, animal cognition, the relationship between mind and body, the immortality of the soul, the existence of God, miracles, and the nature of divine creation. The author also provides an overview of relevant secondary literature (...) and argues for their own interpretation of Shepherd's metaphysics. (shrink)

What is a person? Why do we count certain beings as persons and others not? How is the concept of a person distinct from the concept of a human being, or from the concept of the self? When and why did the concept of a person come into existence? What is the relationship between moral personhood and metaphysical personhood? How has their relationship changed over the last two millennia? This volume presents a genealogy of the concept of a person. It (...) demonstrates how personhood--like the other central concepts of philosophy, law, and everyday life--has gained its significance not through definition but through the accretion of layers of meaning over centuries. We can only fully understand the concept by knowing its history. Essays show further how the concept of a person has five main strands: persons are particulars, roles, entities with special moral significance, rational beings, and selves. Thus, to count someone or something as a person is simultaneously to describe it--as a particular, a role, a rational being, and a self--and to prescribe certain norms concerning how it may act and how others may act towards it. A group of distinguished thinkers and philosophers here untangle these and other insights about personhood, asking us to reconsider our most fundamental assumptions of the self. (shrink)

These are my comments on Ken Winkler's account of Locke's philosophy of language.

This is a review of Peter Anstey's John Locke and Natural Philosophy.

This is about the tension between Epicurean and Galilean accounts of motion in Gassendi. For my more recent thoughts on this, see http://philpapers.org/rec/LOLCEG.