Locke claims that we have sensitive knowledge of the external world, in virtue of the fact that simple ideas are real, true, and adequate. However, despite his dismissive remarks about Cartesian external-world skepticism, Locke gives us little to go on as to how knowledge of the external world survives the fact of perceptual error, or even how perceptual error is possible. I argue that Locke has an in-principle problem explaining perceptual error.
Antonia Lolordo presents an original interpretation of John Locke's metaphysics of moral agency, in which to be a moral agent is simply to be free, rational, and a person.
Draft for Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Knowledge in Modern Philosophy (Bloomsbury). Gassendi and Hobbes knew each other, and their approaches to philosophy often seem similar. They both criticized the Cartesian epistemology of clear and distinct perception. Gassendi engaged at length with skepticism, and also rejected the Aristotelian notion of scientia, arguing instead for a probabilistic view that shows us how we can move on in the absence of certain and evident knowledge. Hobbes, in contrast, retained the notion of scientia, which is (...) the best sort of knowledge and involves causal explanation. He thought, however, that this sort of knowledge was only available in geometry and political philosophy. (shrink)
Offered here is the first comprehensive treatment in English of the philosophical system of the seventeenth century philosopher Pierre Gassendi. Gassendi's importance is widely recognized and is essential for understanding early modern philosophers and scientists such as Locke, Leibniz and Newton. Offering a systematic overview of his contributions, LoLordo situates Gassendi's views within the context of sixteenth and early seventeenth century natural philosophy as represented by a variety of intellectual traditions, including scholastic Aristotelianism, Renaissance Neo-Platonism, and the emerging mechanical philosophy. (...) LoLordo's work will be essential reading for historians of early modern philosophy and science. (shrink)
It is often suggested that certain forms of early modern philosophy are naturalistic. Although I have some sympathy with this description, I argue that applying the category of naturalism to early modern philosophy is not useful. There is another category that does most of the work we want the category of naturalism to do ? one that, unlike naturalism, was actually used by early moderns.
This paper examines what Gassendi and other seventeenth-century atomists had to say about the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, and how their view impacted their conception of mechanism.
The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal parts; (...) he concludes that nothing persists. (shrink)
Gassendi holds that matter is intrinsically active - it possesses an innate active force or power. This paper explains what that active power consists in and why Gassendi adopted this view.
In 1769, the English bishop and theologian Edmund Law published a Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Personal Identity.1 In this work, Law attempted to 'explain and vindicate Mr. Locke's hypothesis' (301) by offering a new account of Lockean persons. Law's account centers around three key claims. First, persons are modes — very roughly, properties — rather than substances. Second, the relevant properties are those that make moral evaluation appropriate, thus taking seriously Locke's insistence that 'person' is a forensic term. (...) And third, the fact that persons are modes is what makes a demonstrative science of morality possible.I am not convinced that Law's interpretation actually vindicates Locke, though it .. (shrink)
ABSTRACT. In his Letters on the motion impressed by a moving mover, Gassendi offers a theory of the motion of composite bodies that closely follows Galileo’s. Elsewhere, he describes the motion of individual atoms in very different terms: individual atoms are always in motion, even when the body that contains them is at rest; atomic motion is discontinuous although the motion of composite bodies is at least apparently continuous; and atomic motion is grounded in an intrinsic vis motrix, motive power, (...) while composite bodies simply persist in their state of motion or rest in the absence of outside intereference. Gassendi does not make much effort to explain how his accounts of atomic and composite motion fit together, and it’s difficult to see how they could possible be integrated. My goal is to explain, given this difficulty, why he accepted both the Galilean theory of the motion of composite bodies and the Epicurean theory of atomic motion. (shrink)
: Malebranche famously objects to Descartes' argument that the nature of the mind is better known than the nature of body as follows: if we had an idea of the mind's nature we would know the possible range of modes of the mind, including the sensory modes, but we do not know those modes and thus can't have an idea of the mind's nature. I argue that Malebranche's objections are readily answerable from within the Cartesian system. This argument involves examining (...) the status of sensations in Descartes, innate ideas, and Malebranche's occasionalism. (shrink)
Antonia LoLordo - Malebranche - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:1 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.1 124-125 Andrew Pyle. Malebranche. London: Routledge, 2003. Pp. xiii + 289. Cloth, $80.00. Despite Malebranche's widely recognized importance, no comprehensive overview of his system was available before Pyle's excellent and wide-ranging study. Pyle agrees with scholarly consensus that occasionalism and the vision in God are Malebranche's two most significant doctrines, but his scope extends well beyond those to matters of theology, physics (...) and biology. In the first half of the book, Pyle lays out Malebranche's two key doctrines as responses to tensions within the Cartesian accounts of causation and of ideas. He details how Malebranche's theory of ideas is involved.. (shrink)
This is about Gassendi's 5th Objections to the Meditations and Descartes' Reply. The main issue is what clear and distinct perception consists in and whether we need a criterion in order to know if we perceive something clearly and distinctly.
The 18th-century American philosopher Jonathan Edwards argues that nothing endures through time. I analyze his argument, paying particular attention to a central principle it relies on, namely that “nothing can exert itself, or operate, when and where it is not existing”. I also consider what I supposed to follow from the conclusion that nothing endures. Edwards is sometimes read as the first four-dimensionalist. I argue that this is wrong. Edwards does not conclude that things persist by having different temporal parts; (...) he concludes that nothing persists. (shrink)
Vignettes of early modern Epicureanism Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9566-9 Authors Antonia LoLordo, Department of Philosophy, 122 Cocke Hall, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA 22904, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.
Gassendi holds both that we only have ideas of material things and that we know – by faith and, at least in later works, by reason as well – that the mind is immaterial. I examine the account of the mind provided in Gassendi’s Objections to the Meditations and show how Gassendi’s two theses can be rendered compatible. Indeed, the two theses, taken together, exemplify Gassendi’s account of the scope and limits of human understanding.
This is about the tension between Epicurean and Galilean accounts of motion in Gassendi. For my more recent thoughts on this, see http://philpapers.org/rec/LOLCEG.
Debates in Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings and Contemporary Responses provides an in-depth, engaging introduction to important issues in modern philosophy. It presents 13 key interpretive debates to students, and ranges in coverage from Descartes' Meditations to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. -/- Debates include: -/- Did Descartes have a developed and consistent view about how the mind interacts with the body? Was Leibniz an idealist, or did he believe in corporeal substances? What is Locke's theory of personal identity? Could there (...) be a Berkeleian metaphysics without God? Did Hume believe in causal powers? What is Kant's transcendental idealism? -/- Each of the thirteen debates consists of a well known article or book chapter from a living philosopher, followed by a new response from a different scholar, specially commissioned for this volume. Every debate is prefaced by an introduction written for those coming upon the debates for the first time and followed by an annotated list for further reading. The volume starts with an introduction that explains the importance and relevance of the modern period and its key debates to philosophy and ends with a glossary that covers terms from both the modern period and the study of the history of philosophy in general. -/- Debates in Modern Philosophy will help students evaluate different interpretations of key texts from modern philosophy, and provide a model for constructing their own positions in these debates. (shrink)
The 17th century's new science and new philosophy was roughly equally divided between Cartesians and Gassendists. Scholars agree that understanding Gassendi's metaphysics, epistemology and scientific method is crucial for understanding the development of modern philosophy, as Gassendis version of Epicureanism provides a third strand of influence on modern philosophy paralleling Cartesianism and scholasticism. Despite this, Gassendi is rather little understood today. I look at Gassendi in the context of his Objections and Counter-Objections to the Meditations, along with Descartes' Replies. This (...) context provides an explicit display of the opposition between two main strands of the new philosophy. I argue---contra a popular characterization of Gassendi's thought as primarily skeptical or even wholly unsystematic---that Gassendi's objections derive from a systematic psychology and cannot be well understood without a grasp of this psychology. ;I begin with a central methodological question in the dispute, the status of clear and distinct perception and what this tells us about proper procedure. This disagreement has it source in competing accounts of the cognitive faculties. Hence I go on to develop an account of Gassendi's theory of the cognitive faculties, and in particular perception, the acquisition of ideas, and reasoning. I then examine Gassendi's initially rather puzzling objections to the cogito, which act as a test-case for my interpretation of Gassendi's theory of cognition. I end with the dispute over the mind-body relationship. Gassendi objects that Descartes has failed to give any more than a nominal definition of the mind, having failed to make intelligible the modes of the mind in terms of its essence. Gassendi, in contrast, seeks an account of the operations of the mind in terms of the micro-level structure of the parts of the brain, and understands this micro-level structure as the genuine essence of the mind. This objection provides an excellent case for examining how Descartes and Gassendi's rival psychologies influenced two very different notions of scientific method. (shrink)
