Joint perception, joint attention, joint know-how

Philosophical Psychology (forthcoming)
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This paper develops a theory of joint attention as based on, and explicable in terms of, the exercise of a minimal kind of perceptual joint know-how. On the action-based view I shall be developing, joint forms of perception are object-involving processes constituted by perceivers’ skillfully co-ordinated motor movements in social space. Joint experience can then be understood as presenting the process to the involved perceivers and joint attention as perceivers’ focus on the object of this process. This theory reconciles at least some primitivist and reductionist intuitions about joint attention.



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Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Shared cooperative activity.Michael E. Bratman - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):327-341.
Meaning.Stephen R. Schiffer - 1973 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 163:478-479.
Joint know-how.Jonathan Birch - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3329–3352.

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