Abstract

The dream of graduate students: an excellent dissertation which developed into an excellent book--scholarly, complete, and unbiased. Sartre's central claims are that emotional response is intentional, signifying an object evaluated, and an emotional response is an act, a chosen response which attempts to "magically" transform a situation too difficult for ordinary instrumental solutions. Fell accepts Sartre's first thesis, but argues that the chosen action and self-deception of the second thesis are not definitive of all emotions, but are rather partially explanatory of a range of self-consciously entertained emotions. In addition, Fell convincingly exposes the difficulty of explaining emotional phenomena solely by phenomenological means: Sartre's analysis of the context of consciousness solely as it appears to consciousness rules out any systematic role for inference or hypothesis, and thus eliminates a causal account, e.g., one attributing continuity, dispositions, or habits to consciousness. Perhaps Fell's most devastating criticism concerns Sartre's final failure to overcome the split between subject and object, between value and fact. For this split, while eliminated on the level of the immediate, unreflective and emotional, reappears even more insistently on the non-deceptive level of the reflective. Thus Fell succeeds in demonstrating the one-sidedness of Sartre's theory of the emotions, but is less illuminating in sketching an "Hegelian Aufhebung" of Sartre's perspective and that of the "processive-objective-naturalistic" approach. There is an excellent bibliography and index.--S. A. S.