Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):24-41 (2016)

Authors
Maciej Sendłak
University of Warsaw
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to show why the theories of impossible worlds do not fully solve the problem of counterpossibles, but merely shift it. Moreover, by making a distinction between two types of languages, we will show that some expectations about proper theory of counterfactuals might be too great.
Keywords Counterpossibles  Impossible Worlds  Counterfactuals  Metaontology  Metametaphysics
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1163/18756735-09301002
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References found in this work BETA

Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.
Impossible Worlds.Daniel Nolan - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):360-372.
Ways Things Can't Be.Greg Restall - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
The Ontology of Impossible Worlds.David A. Vander Laan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):597-620.
On What There is Not.Richard Routley - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (2):151-177.

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Citations of this work BETA

Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism.Maciej Sendłak - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):515-531.
Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.

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