Alternative Frameworks and Counterpossibles

Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (1):24-41 (2016)

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to show why the theories of impossible worlds do not fully solve the problem of counterpossibles, but merely shift it. Moreover, by making a distinction between two types of languages, we will show that some expectations about proper theory of counterfactuals might be too great.

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,855

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-03-20

Downloads
64 (#182,529)

6 months
1 (#386,031)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Maciej Sendłak
University of Warsaw

References found in this work

Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.
Impossible Worlds.Daniel Nolan - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (4):360-372.
Ways Things Can't Be.Greg Restall - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):583-596.
The Ontology of Impossible Worlds.David A. Vander Laan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):597-620.
On What There is Not.Richard Routley - 1982 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43 (2):151-177.

View all 6 references / Add more references

Citations of this work

Linguistic Criteria of Intentionality.Ciecierski Tadeusz - 2016 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 46 (1):35-58.
Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism.Maciej Sendłak - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):515-531.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Counterpossibles.Barak Krakauer - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts
Remarks on Counterpossibles.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2013 - Synthese 190 (4):639-660.
Impossible Worlds.David Vander Laan - 1999 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
Who's Afraid of Impossible Worlds?Edwin D. Mares - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):516-526.
Omission Impossible.Sara Bernstein - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2575-2589.
Teorie metafizyczne światów niemożliwych [Metaphysics of Impossible Worlds].Sendłak Maciej - 2013 - The Metaphysics of Impossible Worlds The Article Outlines the Main Motivations for Postulating Impossible Worlds as Entities Which Are Required for Complete Analysis of Modality. It Also Presents Various Accounts of the Metaphysics of These Worlds. It Dis 8 (3).
What Are Impossible Worlds?Barak Krakauer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):989-1007.
Limits of Hybrid Modal Realism.Maciej Sendłak - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (4):515-531.
Impossible Worlds.Mark Jago - 2013 - Noûs 47 (3):713-728.