A clearer vision

Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-53 (1997)

Authors
Lawrence Shapiro
University of Wisconsin, Madison
Abstract
Frances Egan argues that the states of computational theories of vision are individuated individualistically and, as far as the theory is concerned, are not intentional. Her argument depends on equating the goals and explanatory strategies of computational psychology with those of its algorithmic level. However, closer inspection of computational psychology reveals that the computational level plays an essential role in explaining visual processes and that explanations at this level are nonindividualistic and intentional. In conclusion, I sketch an account of content in which content does the sort of explanatory work that Egan denies is possible
Keywords Computational  Content  Individualism  Science  Vision  Egan, F
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1086/392539
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 38,928
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Computation Without Representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Computation, Individuation, and the Received View on Representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.
The Drink You Have When You're Not Having a Drink.Robert A. Wilson - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (3):273–283.
Levels of Explanation Vindicated.Víctor M. Verdejo & Daniel Quesada - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (1):77-88.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Computational Models: A Modest Role for Content.Frances Egan - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.
Why We View the Brain as a Computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.
Content, Computation and Externalism.Oron Shagrir - 2001 - Mind 110 (438):369-400.
Marr on Computational-Level Theories.Oron Shagrir - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (4):477-500.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
58 ( #123,122 of 2,319,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #214,605 of 2,319,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature