My way or her way: A conundrum in bayesian epistemology of disagreement

Abstract
The proportional weight view in epistemology of disagreement generalizes the equal weight view and proposes that we assign to judgments of different people weights that are proportional to their epistemic qualifications. It is shown that if the resulting degrees of confidence are to constitute a probability function, they must be the weighted arithmetic means of individual degrees of confidence, while if the resulting degrees of confidence are to obey the Bayesian rule of conditionalization, they must be the weighted geometric means of individual degrees of confidence. The double bind entails that the proportional weight view (and its moderate adjustment in favor of one’s own judgment) is inconsistent with Bayesianism.
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