A logic of intentions and beliefs

Journal of Philosophical Logic 22 (5):513 - 544 (1993)
Abstract
Intentions are an important concept in Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. We present a formal theory of intentions and beliefs based on Discourse Representation Theory that captures many of their important logical properties. Unlike possible worlds approaches, this theory does not assume that agents are perfect reasoners, and gives a realistic view of their internal architecture; unlike most representational approaches, it has an objective semantics, and does not rely on an ad hoc labeling of the internal states of agents. We describe a minimal logic for intentions and beliefs that is sound and complete relative to our semantics. We discuss several additional axioms, and the constraints on the models that validate them
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DOI 10.1007/BF01349562
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Center for the Study of Language and Information.
Modal Logic: An Introduction.Brian F. Chellas - 1980 - Cambridge University Press.
A Puzzle About Belief.Saul A. Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.

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Intentions and Potential Intentions Revisited.Xiaocong Fan & John Yen - 2012 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 22 (3):203-230.

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