The origin of intelligibility according to Duns Scotus, William of Alnwick, and Petrus Thomae

Recherches de Theologie Et Philosophie Medievales 81 (1):37-74 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This study investigates a conflict in Duns Scotus ’ doctrine of the origin of intelligible being or intelligibility found in his various treatments of the divine ideas. Scotus holds both that the divine intellect produces the essences of creatable things, and that the essences of creatable things are contained in the divine essence and represented by it to the divine intellect. Although this conflict has escaped the notice of most of Scotus ’ medieval and modern interpreters, two early followers of Scotus, William of Alnwick and Petrus Thomae, recognized it in the course of their detailed examinations of the notion of intelligible being. William simply noted the contradiction and defended an elaborate version of. Peter also defended a complex version of, but additionally attempted to relieve the conflict between Scotus ’ views by arguing that Scotus had intended to be taken only metaphorically.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,867

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Bibliotheca manuscripta Petri Thomae.Garrett Smith - 2010 - Bulletin de Philosophie Medievale 52:161-200.
Scotus and Ockham: selected essays.Allan Bernard Wolter - 2003 - St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications.
Quaestiones de esse intelligibili.Petrus Thomae (ed.) - 2015 - Leuven, Belgium: Leuven.
Petri Thomae Quaestiones de esse intelligibili.Petrus Thomae & Garrett Smith (eds.) - 2015 - Leuven, Belgium: Leuven University Press.
William of Alnwick's analysis of Scotus' ‘formal non-identity’.John H. L. van den Bercken - 2021 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29 (3):435-452.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-01-18

Downloads
17 (#863,839)

6 months
4 (#1,004,663)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references