Why Take Both Boxes?

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The crucial premise of the standard argument for two-boxing in Newcomb's problem, a causal dominance principle, is false. We present some counterexamples. We then offer a metaethical explanation for why the counterexamples arise. Our explanation reveals a new and superior argument for two-boxing, one that eschews the causal dominance principle in favor of a principle linking rational choice to guidance and actual value maximization.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,038

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

New Documents on Josiah Royce.John Clendenning & Frank M. Oppenheim - 1990 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 26 (1):131 - 145.
Reason and Ritual.Martin Hollis - 1968 - Philosophy 43 (165):231 - 247.
Shutters, boxes, but no paradoxes: Time symmetry puzzles in quantum theory.Ruth E. Kastner - 2004 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (1):89 – 94.
Little Boxes.Vern Bullough - 2003 - Free Inquiry 23.
Einstein's Boxes.Travis Norsen - 2005 - American Journal of Physics 73:164--176.
and it Does Not Fit in Boxes.Roddy Cowie - 2011 - In Elisabeth Schellekens & Peter Goldie (eds.), The Aesthetic Mind: Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press. pp. 89.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-10-29

Downloads
216 (#93,409)

6 months
38 (#98,591)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Jack Spencer
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Ian Wells
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

Decision, causality, and predetermination.Boris Kment - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3):638-670.
Knowledge of Objective 'Oughts': Monotonicity and the New Miners Puzzle.Daniel Muñoz & Jack Spencer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):77-91.

View all 25 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1956 - Philosophy of Science 23 (2):166-166.

View all 52 references / Add more references