On Considering a Possible World as Actual: Robert Stalnaker


Authors
Robert Stalnaker
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Abstract
[Robert Stalnaker] Saul Kripke made a convincing case that there are necessary truths that are knowable only a posteriori as well as contingent truths that are knowable a priori. A number of philosophers have used a two-dimensional model semantic apparatus to represent and clarify the phenomena that Kripke pointed to. According to this analysis, statements have truth-conditions in two different ways depending on whether one considers a possible world 'as actual' or 'as counterfactual' in determining the truth-value of the statement relative to that possible world. There are no necessary a posteriori or contingent a priori propositions: rather, contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori statements are statements that are necessary when evaluated one way, and contingent when evaluated the other way. This paper distinguishes two ways that the two-dimensional framework can be interpreted, and argues that one of them gives the better account of what it means to 'consider a world as actual', but that it provides no support for any notion of purely conceptual a priori truth. /// [Thomas Baldwin] Two-dimensional possible world semantic theory suggests that Kripke's examples of the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori should be handled by interpreting names as implicitly indexical. Like Stalnaker, I reject this account of names and accept that Kripke's examples have to be accommodated within a metasemantic theory. But whereas Stalnaker maintains that a metasemantic approach undermines the conception of a priori truth, I argue that it offers the opportunity to develop a conception of the a priori aspect of stipulations, conceived as linguistic performances. The resulting position accommodates Kripke's examples in a way which is both intrinsically plausible and fits with Kripke's actual discussion of them
Keywords Actual  Epistemology  Knowledge  Possible World  Kripke, S
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/1467-8349.00083
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 46,282
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Epistemological Challenges to Mathematical Platonism.Øystein Linnebo - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (3):545-574.
Why Be an Anti-Individualist?Laura Schroeter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):105-141.
Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth.William H. Hanson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):437-459.
Cognitive Dynamics and Indexicals.Simon Prosser - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (4):369–391.

View all 20 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Stalnaker's Problem of Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry.Stephen R. Schiffer - 1986 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April):87-97.
Stalnaker on Intentionality: On Robert Stalnaker's Inquiry.Hartry Field - 1986 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 67 (April):98-112.
On Considering a Possible World as Actual.Robert Stalnaker & Thomas Baldwin - 2001 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes( 75:141-174.
Publications by Robert Stalnaker.Ipotesi Modalita - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press. pp. 296.
Epistemic Consequentialism: Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1):153-168.
Ways a World Might Be.Robert Stalnaker - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 133 (3):455-471.
I—Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2001 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 75 (1):141-156.
II—Robert Stalnaker.Robert Stalnaker - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):153-168.
Possible Worlds and Situations.Robert Stalnaker - 1986 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (1):109 - 123.
Conditionals as Random Variables Robert Stalnaker and Richard Jeffrey.Robert Stalnaker - 1994 - In Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.), Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press. pp. 31.
The Story of 'Fred'.Frank Jackson - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson (ed.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
258 ( #26,614 of 2,285,914 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #56,122 of 2,285,914 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature