Abstract

Consensus and dissent play important roles in science. Both scientific consensus and dissent are said to be epistemically beneficial: consensus is often taken as a mark of knowledge and as a basis for informing decision-making and policy, whereas dissent is often taken as being necessary for scientific advancement, as it can challenge existing knowledge and offer new insights. However, it is unclear how consensus and dissent compare as methods of inquiry and whether they are equally epistemically beneficial. In this thesis, I explore epistemic implications of two accounts of epistemically justified consensus in science and argue these accounts are practically or conceptually problematic. I also discuss the epistemic implications of scientific dissent. I conclude that scientific dissent offers more epistemic benefits than scientific consensus, but that not all dissent is epistemically beneficial: some dissent hinders or impedes science. As such, mechanisms need to be developed to mitigate the epistemic harms caused by epistemically detrimental dissent.