Abstract

I propose that a dishonest signaling system can be evolutionarily stable in eusocial animal societies if the amount of dishonesty is balanced by the chance of non-reproductive workers to advance to the reproductive caste in the future. I express this trade-off in a modified form of Hamilton’s rule, where I distinguish between the real and perceived cost of an altruistic act, and between the real and perceived genetic relatedness between colony members. Furthermore, I elaborate how the vertebrate neuromodulator oxytocin could serve as an internal representation of the perceived cost of an altruistic act and of perceived relatedness. Behavioral and receptor localization data support this hypothesis. The encoding of cost and relatedness by oxytocin is likely integrated with a number of other functions related to social bonding. I conclude with a discussion of honesty in signaling, an outline of testable consequences of this hypothesis, and a comparison between vertebrate and insect eusociality.