Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2067-2085 (2019)

Daniel Stoljar
Australian National University
Gareth Evans famously observed that he can answer the question ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’ by attending to “precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’”. I argue that this observation follows from two independently plausible ideas in philosophy of mind. The first is about rationality and consciousness: it is that to be rational is in part to be required to believe that you are in a conscious state if you are in one, at least if various background conditions are met. The second is about consciousness and attention: it is that consciousness in a belief state consists in its subject engaging, to a sufficient extent, in a certain sort of world-directed attention. I also argue that this suggestion is superior to others that have been made in the literature regarding Evan’s observation.
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-1111-x
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.

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Citations of this work BETA

Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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