They Can’t Take That Away from Me: Restricting the Reach of Morality's Demands

In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 3. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 203-234 (2013)
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Abstract

This chapter highlights and assesses an important form of argument that has often been deployed in debates over moral demandingness. 'They can’t take that away from me' arguments claim to identify something which morality cannot ask us to give up — something which morality allegedly cannot take away from us. Does any argument of this kind succeed? This chapter investigates that question by sketching and critiquing three such arguments from the contemporary literature, including a well-known argument of Bernard Williams’. It also considers a further impediment to the scope or power of such arguments, namely how little they show even if they succeed. The closing suggestion is that those eager to resist extreme moral demands ought to object at an earlier stage to the arguments which seem to generate such demands.

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Sarah Stroud
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Citations of this work

Praise, blame, and demandingness.Rick Morris - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1857-1869.
Duty-Sensitive Self-Ownership.Ben Bryan - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (2):264-283.

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