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The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal Conduct
Philosophical Quarterly 15 (58):89-90 (1965)
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Citations of this work
Rethinking Health: Healthy or Healthier than?S. Andrew Schroeder - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):131-159.
Hacking on the looping effects of psychiatric classifications: What is an interactive and indifferent kind?Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (3):329 – 344.
Philosophy of Science, Psychiatric Classification, and the DSM.Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2019 - In Bluhm Robyn & Tekin Serife (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. London: Bloomsbury. pp. 177-196.
“Disease Entity” as the Key Theoretical Concept of Medicine.Peter Hucklenbroich - 2014 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 39 (6):609-633.
A Multi-Dimensional Pluralist Response to the DSM-Controversies.Anke Bueter - 2019 - Perspectives on Science 27 (2):316-343.
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