In Iwao Hirose & Jonas Olson (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. Oxford University Press. pp. 80-95 (2015)

Authors
Christine Tappolet
Université de Montréal
Abstract
Evaluative concepts and emotions appear closely connected. According to a prominent account, this relation can be expressed by propositions of the form ‘something is admirable if and only if feeling admiration is appropriate in response to it’. The first section discusses various interpretations of such ‘Value-Emotion Equivalences’, for example the Fitting Attitude Analysis, and it offers a plausible way to read them. The main virtue of the proposed way to read them is that it is well-supported by a promising account of emotions, namely the Perceptual Theory of Emotions, which emphasises the analogies between emotions and sensory perceptual experiences. The second section considers a worry about whether concepts such as admirable are really evaluative. It is maintained that even though the arguments used to show that thick terms and concepts are not inherently evaluative can be transposed to affective concepts, these arguments can be resisted. So there is no need to abandon the intuitive claim that affective concepts are inherently evaluative.
Keywords evaluative concepts  fitting attitude analysis  affective concepts  thick concepts  emotions  perceptual experiences  the perceptual theory of emotions
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DOI 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199959303.013.0006
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References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
The Emotional Construction of Morals.Jesse Prinz - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):701-704.

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Citations of this work BETA

Moral Sentimentalism.Anttin D. Kauppinen - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Phenomenology and the Perceptual Model of Emotion.Poellner Peter - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (3):261-288.
Amusement and Beyond.Steffen Steinert - 2017 - Dissertation, LMU München
Emotion and Value : A Phenomenological Approach.Vanello Daniel - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Warwick. Department of Philosophy

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