Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14 (forthcoming)

Authors
Levi Tenen
Indiana University, Bloomington
Abstract
A number of writers argue that objects can be valuable for their own sakes on account of their extrinsic features. No one has offered an account, though, that shows exactly how or why objects have this sort of value. I seek to provide such an account. I suggest that an object can have final value on account of its relation to someone one loves or admires, where it is one’s warranted love or admiration for the person that renders the related object valuable for its own sake. I identify a feature of love and admiration that shows exactly why this is the case. I then end by suggesting how this account locates a reason to value non-intrinsically good things for their own sakes that avoids a “wrong reason” objection facing alternative views.
Keywords Value Theory  Extrinsic Final Value  Heirlooms  Wrong Reasons
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DOI 10.1007/s10790-019-09721-5
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