Synthese 99 (2):251–76 (1994)

John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis
The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) exhibits a tragedy in this sense: if the players are fully informed and rational, they are condemned to a jointly dispreferred outcome. In this essay I address the following question: What feature of the PD's payoff structure is necessary and sufficient to produce the tragedy? In answering it I use the notion of a trembling-hand equilibrium. In the final section I discuss an implication of my argument, an implication which bears on the persistence of the problem posed by the PD.
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References found in this work BETA

Morals by Agreement.David Gauthier - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
The Emergence of Norms.Edna Ullmann-Margalit - 1977 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Prisoner's Dilemma From a Moral Point of View.John J. Tilley - 1996 - Theory and Decision 41 (2):187-193.

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