From Intuitions to Objects. Towards Explaining the Structure of the B-Deduction
Abstract
I sketch a novel reading of the B-Deduction, Kant’s argument aimed at establishing the objectivity of the categories. I argue that this requires both that they purport to be about objects and do so successfully. The objectivity of the categories consists in their purported and successful representation of objects of experience, as contrasted with their failure to even represent anything and with their representation of something that does not exist or not as represented. This is why the deduction of the categories consists of two main steps. In §§15–20, their objective purport is established by arguing that “[a]ll sensible intuitions stand under the categories“ (B143). In §§21–27, their objective success is established by arguing for their “validity a priori in regard to all objects of our senses” (B145). To understand why §20 concludes only the first of two steps of the argument, one has to recognize that it makes a claim about sensible intuitions and not yet about their objects.