On desires and practical reasons

Acta Analytica 19 (32):5-18 (2004)
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Abstract

A common and plausible assumption about the relation between desires and practical reasons—namely, that if øing is an optimal way (or even just a way) for a person, P, to satisfy one of his or her desires, then P has a (normative) reason to ø. This paper discusses that assumption. Although it does not deny that desires are a source of practical reasons, it shows that in some situations, rare though not impossible, P can lack a reason to ø despite having a desire that he or she could satisfy optimally by øing.

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John J. Tilley
Indiana University Purdue University, Indianapolis

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References found in this work

What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.
Logic and Conversation.H. P. Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (eds.), The Logic of Grammar. Encino, CA: pp. 64-75.
Practical reason and norms.Joseph Raz - 1975 - London: Hutchinson.
The Normativity of Instrumental Reason.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1997 - In Garrett Cullity & Berys Nigel Gaut (eds.), Ethics and practical reason. New York: Oxford University Press.

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