Non-Naturalism Gone Quasi: Explaining the Necessary Connections between the Natural and the Normative

Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13 (2018)
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Non-naturalism—roughly the view that normative properties and facts are sui generis—may be combined either with cognitivism or with non-cognitivism. The chapter starts by explaining how the metaphysically necessary connections between the natural and the normative raise an explanatory challenge for realist non-naturalism, and how it is not at all obvious that quasi-realism offers a way of escaping the challenge. Having briefly explored different kinds of accounts of what it is to have thoughts concerning metaphysical necessity, it then proceeds to argue that once we understand the explanatory challenge in the light of a quasi-realist take on normative judgments, this challenge takes the shape of a first-order normative issue, and will be answerable by the quasi-realists’ lights. When it comes to explaining the necessary connections between the normative and the natural, all will be fine, it seems, if non-naturalists just go a little quasi.



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Teemu Toppinen
Tampere University

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Error and the Limits of Quasi-Realism.Graham Bex-Priestley - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1051-1063.

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