Abstract

Husserl has dealt with the material relation of wholes to parts at the beginning of his philosophical career, namely in his third Logical Investigation, as well as, much later, in the texts edited by Landgrebe in Erfahrung und Urteil . The topic of mereology compels one to consider the relation between the formal analytic a priori and the material synthetic a priori within the objective realmof intentionality. Initially Husserl tried to find an articulation between the two a priori's in the realm of objectivity. Subsequently Husserl insisted on the irreducible differences between the laws governing these two forms of the a priori. But eventually Husserl reformulated the problem in the framework of the subjective a priori regulating the functioning of intentionality. Only the teleological horizon of consciousness, by its indebtedness to genealogy, can outline a possible connection of the two a priori's; and do this, inastar as for a consciousness that is always already ahead of itself, the cognition of the world of pure forms also allows for the recognition of material a priori's