Abstract

Heraclitus is famous for claiming that “all things are one,” (ἓν πάντα εἶναι). But what does this mean? In this thesis, I offer a novel, ground-theoretic model for unity in Heraclitus: Cosmic unity through priority monism. I will argue that all things are one through their shared metaphysical ground in the cosmos. My approach is novel in that it diverges from the standard translation of “ἓν πάντα εἶναι” as a means of explaining the unity of conceptual entities. The Greek is ambiguous and can be translated as “all things (conceptual entities) are one” or “all things (material entities) are one”. In taking this claim to be related to both conceptual and material entities, I offer an account that takes seriously Heraclitus’s representation of unity between material entities. First, I present what I will call the ‘Problem of Unity’ in Heraclitus. Then, I give an account of historical interpretations that have attempted to solve the problem of unity, and highlight their theoretical limitations. Next, I turn to my proposed solution through an analysis of metaphysical priority throughout Heraclitus’s fragments. In doing so, I show that Heraclitus’s cosmos appears to be the most metaphysically basic entity. Thus, I argue that Heraclitus’s cosmos grounds its proper parts. Lastly, I show that Heraclitus’s cosmology coincides with a contemporary argument for priority monism through the internal relatedness of all the parts of the cosmos (Schaffer, 2010a; Schaffer, 2010b). I conclude that the claim “all things are one” means that the proper parts of the cosmos share a metaphysical ground: the cosmos itself.