Heraclitus

Heraclitus is the first philosopher, and one of the few ones, who is aware of original contradiction. His thought still presents some ambiguities mostly due to the still intuitive discovery of the relation between language, contradiction and logos. Heraclitus saw the contradiction. He does not care about how the fact of communication is possible, as it indeed is, but rather he endeavours to put into question its problematic essence. -/- .

Two prominent metaphors in Greek and Roman political philosophy are surveyed here, with a view to determining their possible meanings and the plausibility of the claims advanced by those possible meanings.

Paradoxical Utterances. An Approximation about Nishida’s Use of Heraclitus’ Fragments in An Inquiry into the Good (1911) -/- The paper discusses the use of Heraclitus’ ideas in Nishida Kitarõ early work, An inquiry into the Good (1911), in order to show how both thinkers, distant in time and philosophical tradition, coincide in present the formative process of reality, defending a common principle that impulses the process (named logos and “pure experience”). It also discusses how these principles can be feasible strategies (...) to escape from a substance-based ontology, but resulting in linguistic paradoxical assertions, able to show the possibility for an identity of opposites. (shrink)

The earliest recorded philosophical use of the term "phusis" occurs in the fragments of Heraclitus (most notably at B1 and B123). Phusis, in the non-philosophical writings relevant to Heraclitus’s time (e.g. from Homer to Aeschylus and Pindar), was generally used to characterize the external physical appearance of something. Heraclitus, on the other hand, seems to have used the term in the completely opposite manner: an object’s phusis is hidden (kruptesthai) and greater (kreissōn) than the external appearance (B123 and B54). Despite (...) this difference, Heraclitus’s use has an affinity with the common use in his time: phusis is used to characterize things. In B1, for example, Heraclitus makes it clear that he is interested in explaining the nature of each thing as opposed to some cosmic principle of Nature. By examining various fragments, I make the case that the phusis of a thing, for Heraclitus, can be defined as the set of opposites necessarily inherent in an object upon which all objects of that kind depend for their existence. The interesting result is that Heraclitus’s novel use of phusis happens to be the foundation for one of the ways in which opposites form a unity. This particular thesis states that there are essential properties inherent in objects which are pairs of opposites sufficient to determine the unity of the object in question. If this is right, then we can read some fragments which contain descriptions of worldly objects (e.g. bows, lyres, rivers, barley drinks etc.) in a new light. These descriptions of worldly objects might not be meant to stand as metaphoric symbols for cosmic principles, as is often thought; rather, they can be read as instances of Heraclitus attempting to do a metaphysics of objects. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the various characteristics of Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation that can reasonably be gleaned from the extant fragments. While there has been some recent work on Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation, there has been a lack of discussion concerning the properties of the particular elements and their relation to the cardinal opposites. In this paper I argue that fragment B126 (“Cold things warm up, warm things cool off; wet things dry up and dry things moisten”) (...) is an explanandum for Heraclitus. It is meant to invoke certain questions in his readers’ minds: How is it that cold things come to hold an opposing property (i.e. “hot”)? What type of change occurs such that a wet thing can become dry? How is it that things hold these properties in the first place? I argue that Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation (B31, B36 and B76) is the explanans for B126 and is capable of answering these questions. That is, the observable change evident in B126 is explained by a set of transformations between elemental stuffs. Because of this connection between B126 and his theory of elements, Heraclitus’ theory of elemental transformation is rightly understood as a ‘unity of opposites’ thesis. However, I argue that the transformation of opposites can only be one opposites thesis among several opposites theses. (shrink)

This second Companion deals with the ancient theories of the psyche. The essays range over more than eight hundred years of psychological enquiry and provide critical analyses not only of the ancient discussions of the nature of the psyche and its states, but of such central topics as perception, subjectivity, the explanation of action, and what it is to be a person. In examining the wide variety of the different psychological theories offered by the ancient thinkers, from the increasingly complex (...) materialism of the Presocratics and Hellenistics to the dualism of Plato and Plotinus, the collection demonstrates that psychology had become a wide-ranging and sophisticated discipline long before Descartes. The essays will be of interest not only to ancient philosophers but also to all those studying psychology and its history. (shrink)

An analysis of Hippolytus' Refutation of All Heresies, to discover his practices and motivations in preserving and quoting extracts from Greek Philosophy, in particular his important contribution to our knowledge of Presocratic Philosophy. The work argues that such sources must be read as embedded texts, and that fragments must not be extracted and treated in isolation from the quoting authority whose interests and knowledge are important in interpreting the material.

The advent of logical positivism contributed to the sharp definitional demarcation between what we consider mythical (mythos) and what we take to be a true account (logos). This essay attempts to go back to one of the sources of such a supposed distinction. By analyzing the Gorgias, I will show that even Plato did not make such a distinction. In fact, Plato even constructed a theory of justice that made use of myth as its medium. The Platonic Myth in the (...) Gorgias was used as true logos in order to justify Socrates’ use of the myth as the paradigm of a life that is philosophical in contrast to that of his accusers who espoused mere sophistry. By using the concept of historia in relation with the concept of mythos, Plato regarded the futuristic afterlife in the myth as a sufficient condition to live a just life. This sufficient condition exemplified by the Myth in the Gorgias is a measuring rod by which we can compare our present system of justice. (shrink)

This study compares Heraclitus and Franz Kafka on the basis of paradoxes that they raise about philosophical method. I argue that both writers use rhetorically similar paradoxes to express problems of human oblivion. On the broadest level, I find that the Heraclitean paradox of method has played a noteworthy role in Western philosophical literature from ancient times to the present. ;In the first chapter of my study, I establish that the metaphor of the "way" is used by Greeks such as (...) Homer and Hesiod to describe method in terms of memory and oblivion. Then I argue that Heraclitus, using this metaphor in a contradictory manner, formulates a paradox of method. Heraclitus emphasizes oblivion when he describes method as a "way" that is both straight and crooked or upward and downward. ;Chapters on Plato's Republic and Martin Heidegger's Being and Time investigate the development of this Heraclitean paradox into an important account of method. Plato's upward path toward truth is consistently and paradoxically accompanied by a downward inclination toward oblivion and ignorance. Heidegger, attributing crucial insights to Heraclitus, describes how humans are caught in a downward movement of forgetfulness which is concurrently a trend of upward disclosure. ;A chapter on Maurice Blanchot, who compares Heraclitus and Kafka's treatment of oblivion, serves as a transition to three chapters on Kafka. After examining how Kafka uses the metaphor of the way to express a paradoxical view of transcendence, I focus on "The Judgment," showing that this major story depicts a struggle between memory and oblivion in Heraclitean terms. To give a primary example, the strange concurrence of ways up and down at the story's end brings Heraclitus's paradox to bear on afterlife; while Kafka's protagonist falls toward oblivion, a simultaneous rise of traffic signifies transcendence. I conclude that Kafka's account of the way beyond mortal existence renews Heraclitus's emphasis on oblivion as a paradoxical component of the human search for truth. (shrink)

We raise the issue of language in Heraclitus with a discussion of the meaning of the word Logos, as saying and speaking. This point we explore with Heidegger's analysis of the Logos of Heraclitus in discussing the ontological relation of language to the Logos. This perspective becomes central to our understanding of what Heraclitus means by "speaking in accord with the Logos." In discussing the issue, we first follow Heraclitus' hints in the fragments to what we call those conditions which (...) alienate man from the Logos. ;We also indicate how the fragments may address themselves to the issue of speaking in accord with the Logos. In discussing this matter, we explore Heidegger's notion of the essence of speaking in accord with the Logos as a "hearkened attunement." This idea we take up as constituting apprehension, i.e., thinking, in its fullest sense, which we consider from different aspects as hearkening, or attentive listening, and as attunement. Hearing or listening, as hearkening, we suggest, is intrinsic to grasping and apprehending the Logos. We also consider it essential to speaking in accord with the Logos; and that also means becoming attuned to the Logos as a harmonie, which we discuss in different contexts throughout the dissertation as a unity in opposition. ;We also follow Heraclitus' hints pertaining to how man may become attuned to the Logos. This, we emphasize, may take place as an aesthetic event. Heidegger's notion of art has given us food for thought with regard to this point. We also suggest that the notion of "cosmos" appears to carry an aesthetic sense in Heraclitus. The aesthetic phenomenon, we argue, especially appears to announce itself by the statement in Fragment 8 that "the most beautiful harmony comes from discord." In terms of language, we suggest that this would mean that speaking in attunement is giving voice in struggle to the Logos as radiance, and as beauty. Such speaking we have also characterized as a "suffering experience," and we highlight this point with a discussion of Fragment 92, which we call the Sibyl's suffering encounter with the Logos. (shrink)

The article discusses the problem of constancy and change in the thought of Heraclitus of Ephesus. The discussion is based on a thorough examination of the three fragments , the subject of which is change depicted as the river. Two fragments, B 12 and B 49 a, considered from the perspective of human physiology and biology, respectively, have a lot in common. The Heraclitean metaphor of the river shows how from the sensations that the human being perceives, transformed in the (...) humoral streams of the body, emerges human consciousness, referred to as psyche. The rational soul comes into being and grows on the way upwards: from the moisture to the dryness . In the context of other fragments , one could risk a claim that the emergence of an intelligent soul takes place in two dimensions: the cosmic and the human . Human cognition is born and intellectual life grows where these two dimensions meet. Human life in its physiological aspect alone cannot bring the advantages of the information inferred from the perceived sensations. It is the process of evaporation that transforms these sensual data into a more sophisticated structure , thanks to which the human being — despite the continuous flow of the stream of sensations — remain the human being . As it may be concluded from our analysis of fragment B 49a, there is a plenty of rivers of life — as many as human individuals — and each of these rivers is identical to others. This is because through stepping into their river, each human being undergoes self-realization in a constantly repetitive pre-set framework which creates an unbroken cycle of life and death. Each human being is faced with the influence of these two factors in every moment of their existence: they are and they are not at the same time. In this way human beings take part in the realization of the law of identity of life and death, whose struggle manifest itself cosmically in the phenomenon of passage: we are the river that flows and passes by. Similar is the whole cosmos, metaphorically presented in B 91 as the river of the world. This image covers the whole realm of things and marks the height of the Heraclitean idea of the identity of opposites. The river banks correspond logically to two most important physical opposites: fire and “non-fire”, which unremittingly trigger the process of creation of things. Every moment the world is being transformed, as are the flowing, always fresh, waters of the river, to which no one can step more than once, because any next time the river will be different; only the banks will stay the same. The image used by Heraclitus of Ephesus helps us realize the role of the unity and diversity — two inseparable attributes of the universe. One cosmos is like one river, everything flows in it, but the cosmos remains — thanks to the everlasting Logos-Fire, the ultimate guarantee of the existence of everything, including the human being and their soul . Thanks to the fire of the soul a human beings find their identity with the cosmic Logos-Reason and Fire through cognition. Only this identity can enable the human being to realize some fixed model of life in keeping with the cosmic laws of physical flux and of the unity of opposites. In this way the human microcosm becomes a mirror image of the macrocosmic activity of the Logos.Key words HERACLITUS, RIVER-FRAGMENT. (shrink)

This article aims to throw light on a recurrent structural feature of Heraclitus' style that, it will be argued, serves as a tool to enrich interpretation of his fragments. Named after the bow image used by the philosopher in B51, the ‘bow composition’ will be presented as a narrative technique developed by Heraclitus to reveal his conception of the world. In B51 we read: οὐ ξυνιᾶσιν ὅκως διαϕερόμενον ἑωυτῶι ὁμολογέει· παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης . Following an assumption that (...) will be defended later, I argue that Heraclitus attempts through his text to demonstrate how ‘what is in variance agrees with itself’. One of his strategies to this end would be the bow composition, a way to structure his statements in which its first and last terms share the same root but have subtle suffix or prefix differences in order to depict that while being related they still maintain some difference . By means of employing such structure to describe reality Heraclitus would imitate the world order in his word order by providing his audience with an analogy that once perceived in the text would teach them how to correctly interpret nature itself. (shrink)

The purpose of the present article is to examine the use of Logos as an ontological term in the Plotinian system and to seek to trace its connexion with Stoicism. Although at first the fact that the fundamental meaning metaphysically of Logos for Plotinus is a spiritual activity due, both as created and as creator, to the desire for contemplation may appear to be an obstacle to a close resemblance with the Spermatic Logos of Stoicism, the creative aspect of the (...) elemental Fire, nevertheless abundant and striking similarities in other respects seem to furnish conclusive evidence that the title which I have selected is not mistaken. The full importance of the Plotinian Logos cannot indeed be grasped until the development of the term has been studied not merely in Stoicism but in Philo and early Patristic Literature; for then the common function of Logos in every system, the reconciliation of the transcendent and the immanent views of God, is clearly manifested. But here only a brief indication of the evolution of the Logos doctrine between the diffusion of Stoic thought and the emergence of Neoplatonism is possible. Chief interest will be directed to the use by Plotinus of the spermatic conception, fundamentally Stoic, of a creative Nature which informs and pervades the Cosmos as its immanent Logos. (shrink)

This paper addresses two interrelated questions. The first question is our relation, as the modern westerners that we are, to Greek philosophy in its historical context. The second question is the relation between Greek philosophical conceptions of the self and what we moderns take ourselves to be when we try to think about the world objectively. My inquiry is motivated by the belief that what a philosopher of the distant past can say to us is influenced by our own independent (...) viewpoint, a viewpoint which may enable us to use that philosopher as a contributor to debates of which he himself had no inkling. Greek philosophers were innocent of the Cartesian tradition and the problems it has generated concerning the connection, if any, between an individual subject of consciousness and the so-called 'external world'. However, I argue that early Greek speculation about the physical world was inward as well as outward looking. Their attempts to think about the world objectively raised issues about the nature of the self — the inquiring (or non-inquiring) subject — issues that, in the case of Heraclitus, are quite explicit. Following up my earlier point about linking modern viewpoints to ancient insights, I make a comparison beween parts of Thomas Nagel's book, The View from Nowhere, and the philosophy of Heraclitus. In particular, I argue that Heraclitus adumbrates a concept analogous to Nagel's 'objective self and shares some of Nagel's interests in integrating that perspective with the practice of being a person in the everyday world. In the final part of the paper I comment briefly on Plato's and Aristotle's criticism of Heraclitus, a criticism that, from a modern perspective, seems to me misconceived. I also offer the Stoic Emperor Marcus Aurelius, who was influenced by Heraclitus, as an excellent example of what it could mean to combine an objective viewpoint with one's ordinary humanity. More generally, the paper may be read as a defence of objectivity — not in the sense that we can hope to understand the world independently of our own concepts or culture (I sidestep any questions about objective truth), but in the sense, rather, that trying to get beyond an irreducibly personal view of things is a basic human propensity (property of the self) even though our use of it seems bound to be (and perhaps should be) selective. (shrink)

In her 1996 and 2006 essays “Being and Becoming: Rhetorical Ontology in Early Greek Thought” and “The Task of the Bow: Heraclitus’ Rhetorical Critique of Epic Language,” Carol Poster was the first to argue for the historical and theoretical relevance of Heraclitus in the discipline of rhetoric. Despite the admonitions of Edward Schiappa (1999) and Thomas Cole (1991) against applying rhetorical theories that only emerged after the fourth century BCE to pre- or proto-rhetorical texts, Poster argues that Heraclitus merits the (...) attention of rhetorical as well as philosophical scholarship not only because Heraclitus had such a profound influence on the thought and work of thinkers who would later become the ancient .. (shrink)