Peering into the foundations of inquiry: An ontology of conscious experience along Husserlian lines

Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):280-300 (2005)
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Abstract

Consciousness is central to what we study in psychology and how we study it. This paper provides a description of the fundamental features and processes of consciousness. Based on Husserl's phenomenology, it begins with a description of Husserl's two most foundational, phenomenological claims: that we 'see' conscious acts, and that we 'see' that we 'see' them. Upon this footing, I explore two forms of skepticism, and I demonstrate their inherent problems. With skepticism described, I explicate an ontology of consciousness. First, I provide a "presentational" model of consciousness that depicts the relation between conscious acts and the objects of consciousness. Second, I explain the importance of "Evidenz." Third, I provide a description of the ubiquitous nature of essences and their importance for a model of consciousness. Fourth, I briefly explain Husserl's account of transcendence. And finally, I describe intentionality and provide a clarification of the nature and function of ideas. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)

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