Authors
Peter Vickers
Durham University
Abstract
This paper follows up a debate as to whether classical electrodynamics is inconsistent. Mathias Frisch makes the claim in Inconsistency, Asymmetry and Non-Locality ([2005]), but this has been quickly countered by F. A. Muller ([2007]) and Gordon Belot ([2007]). Here I argue that both Muller and Belot fail to connect with the background assumptions that support Frisch's claim. Responding to Belot I explicate Frisch's position in more detail, before providing my own criticisms. Correcting Frisch's position, I find that I can present the theory in a way both authors can agree upon. Differences then manifest themselves purely within the reasoning methods employed. Introduction Features of the Theory Frisch's Inconsistency Claim Defending Frisch 4.1 Muller 4.2 Belot Difficulties for Frisch and a Compromise Conclusion CiteULike     Connotea     Del.icio.us     What's this?
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axn039
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References found in this work BETA

Is Classical Electrodynamics an Inconsistent Theory?Gordon Belot - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):263-282.
Inconsistency in Classical Electrodynamics?F. A. Muller - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (2):253-277.

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Citations of this work BETA

How Theories Represent.Otávio Bueno & Steven French - 2011 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (4):857-894.
One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity.Margaret Morrison - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):342-351.
One Phenomenon, Many Models: Inconsistency and Complementarity.Margaret Morrison - 2011 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 42 (2):342-351.
‘The Most Sacred Tenet’? Causal Reasoning in Physics.Mathias Frisch - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):459-474.
What Counts as a Newtonian System? The View From Norton’s Dome.Samuel Craig Fletcher - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):275-297.

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