Causes, Laws, and Free Will: Why Determinism Doesn't Matter

New York, NY, USA: Oup Usa (2013)
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Abstract

In Causes, Laws, and Free Will, Kadri Vihvelin argues that we can have free will even if everything we do is predictable given the laws of nature and the past. The belief that determinism robs us of free will springs from mistaken beliefs about the metaphysics of causation, the nature of laws, and the logic of counterfactuals

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Kadri Vihvelin
University of Southern California

Citations of this work

Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.
(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. Wiley. pp. 58-83.

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