In Streit um die Freiheit: Philosophische und theologische Beiträge. Paderborn: Schoeningh/Brill (forthcoming)

Authors
Randolph Clarke
Florida State University
Abstract
This paper examines the view of abilities to act advanced by Kadri Vihvelin in Causes, Laws, and Free Will. Vihvelin argues that (i) abilities of an important kind are “structurally” like dispositions such as fragility; (ii) ascriptions of dispositions can be analyzed in terms of counterfactual conditionals; (iii) ascriptions of abilities of the kind in question can be analyzed similarly; and (iv) we have the free will we think we have by having abilities of this kind and being in circumstances that are propitious for their exercise. I raise doubt about each of these claims. Further, I argue that even if abilities of the kind in question are dispositions, and even if determinism is compatible with our commonly having unexercised abilities of this kind, the compatibility of determinism and free will remains in question.
Keywords abilities  dispositions  free will  trying
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References found in this work BETA

Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - Oxford University Press.
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
How to Speak of the Colors.Mark Johnston - 1992 - Philosophical Studies 68 (3):221-263.
Finkish Dispositions.David K. Lewis - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.
Dispositions and Conditionals.C. B. Martin - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (174):1-8.

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