Authors
Alberto Voltolini
Università degli Studi di Torino
Abstract
In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a) what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution, two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale). Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentionale only fictionally.
Keywords intentional identity  intentional objects  intentional contents  schematic objects
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Louise M. Antony - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (2):275.
Mind and World.Huw Price & John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Books 38 (3):169-181.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1974 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 36 (3):602-605.

View all 53 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Talking About Intentional Objects.Michael Gorman - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
Consequences of Schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
Talking About Intentional Objects.Michael Gorman - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (2):135-144.
Varieties of Intentional Objects.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 (194):23-32.
Varieties of Intentional Objects.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2013 - Semiotica 2013 (194):189–206.
Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects.Dale Jacquette - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):1-19.
Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects.Dale Jacquette - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):1-19.
Intentional Objects.Tim Crane - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):298-317.
There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-11-03

Total views
124 ( #92,854 of 2,498,146 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #44,418 of 2,498,146 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes