Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 24:282-307 (2017)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
In this paper, I want to address once more the venerable problem of intentional
identity, the problem of how different thoughts can be about the same thing even
if this thing does not exist. First, I will try to show that antirealist approaches to this
problem are doomed to fail. For they ultimately share a problematic assumption, namely
that thinking about something involves identifying it. Second, I will claim that once one
rejects this assumption and holds instead that thoughts are constituted either by what
they are about, their intentional objects, or by what determines their proposition-like
intentional contents, one can address the problem of intentional identity in a different
way. One can indeed provide a new solution to it that basically relies on two factors: a)
what sort of metaphysical nature intentional objects effectively possess, once they are
conceived as schematic objects à la Crane (2001, 2013); b) whether such objects really
belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is. According to this solution,
two thoughts are about the same nonexistent intentional object iff i) that object satisfies
the identity criterion for objects of that metaphysical kind and ii) objects of that kind
belong to the overall ontological inventory of what there is, independently of whether
they exist (in a suitable first-order sense of existence). As such, this solution is neither
realist nor antirealist: only if condition ii) is satisfied, different thoughts can be about
the same nonexistent intentionale; otherwise, they are simply constituted by the same
intentional content (provided that this content is not equated with that intentionale).
Third, armed with this solution, I will hold that one can find a suitable treatment of the
specific and related problem of whether different people may mock-think about the
same thing, even if there really is no such thing. Finally, I will try to show that this treatment can be also applied to the case in which different thoughts are, according to
phenomenology, about the same intentionale and yet this intentionale is of a kind such that there really are no things of that kind. For in this case, such thoughts are about the same intentionale only fictionally.
|
Keywords | intentional identity intentional objects intentional contents schematic objects |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
View all 53 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Consequences of Schematism.Alberto Voltolini - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):135-150.
Which Witch is Which? Exotic Objects and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):721-739.
Quantification with Intentional and with Intensional Verbs.Friederike Moltmann - 2015 - In Alessandro Torza (ed.), Quantifiers, Quantifiers, and Quantifiers. Springer.
Varieties of Intentional Objects.Arkadiusz Chrudzimski - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 17 (194):23-32.
The problem of intentionality and intentional objects critical analysis of the proposal by Searle and Crane.Ilaria Canavotto - 2013 - Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 105 (1):17-40.
Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects.Dale Jacquette - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):1-19.
Meinong's Theory of Defective Objects.Dale Jacquette - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):1-19.
Why Frege Cases Do Involve Cognitive Phenomenology but Only Indirectly.Alberto Voltolini - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):205-221.
There Are Intentionalia of Which It Is True That Such Objects Do Not Exist.Alberto Voltolini - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):394-414.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2017-11-03
Total views
124 ( #92,854 of 2,498,146 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #44,418 of 2,498,146 )
2017-11-03
Total views
124 ( #92,854 of 2,498,146 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
19 ( #44,418 of 2,498,146 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads