Assumption-based argumentation for extended disjunctive logic programming and its relation to nonmonotonic reasoning

Argument and Computation:1-45 (2023)
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Abstract

The motivation of this study is that Reiter’s default theory as well as assumption-based argumentation frameworks corresponding to default theories have difficulties in handling disjunctive information, while a disjunctive default theory (ddt) avoids them. This paper presents the semantic correspondence between generalized assumption-based argumentation (ABA) and extended disjunctive logic programming as well as the correspondence between ABA and nonmonotonic reasoning approaches such as disjunctive default logic and prioritized circumscription. To overcome the above-mentioned difficulties of ABA frameworks corresponding to default theories, we propose an assumption-based framework (ABF) translated from an extended disjunctive logic program (EDLP) since an EDLP can be translated into a ddt. Our ABF incorporates explicit negation and the connective of disjunction “|” to Heyninck and Arieli’s ABF induced by a disjunctive logic program. In this paper, first, we show how arguments are constructed from disjunctive rules in our proposed ABF. Then, we show the correspondence between answer sets of an EDLP P and stable extensions of the ABF translated from P with trivialization rules. After defining rationality postulates, we show answer sets of a consistent EDLP are captured by consistent stable extensions of the translated ABF with no trivialization rules. Finally, we show the correspondence between ABA and disjunctive default logic (resp. prioritized circumscription). The relation between ABA and possible model semantics of EDLPs is also discussed.

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