In this chapter, I contend with several objections to the Idealist interpretation of the belief about “bodies” Hume ascribes to us. I show that its seeming absurdity is dispelled when we note that Hume’s account of meaning allows for ignorance about the meaning of terms; that initial appearances not... see more

In this chapter, I present the different ways of interpreting the belief in external objects (“bodies”) that Hume ascribes to us. There is here a plethora of interpretations, engendered by the fact that Hume distinguishes between the belief of the ordinary (vulgar) person (including philosophers out... see more

In this chapter, I defend the Idealist interpretation of the belief about “bodies” Hume ascribes to us (both vulgar and philosophers), according to which we can only think about perceptions, and not, as the Materialist Hume claims, about material bodies. First, I adduce some explicit statements Hume... see more

In this chapter, I continue to explore the consequences of the Idealist Interpretation for Hume’s Science of Man. Here, I consider how the two interpretations impinge on Hume’s nominalism, his account of the way general terms (‘dog’, ‘man’, e.g.) function in the absence of abstract ideas. (General t... see more

In this chapter, I begin to consider the consequences of the Idealist Interpretation for Hume’s Science of Man. The first question pertains to the spatial and causal thoughts we can have. We have uncovered Idealist limitations on the spatiality of the objects we can think about (Chap. 5). So a worry... see more

In this chapter, I consider – from the two perspectives (Idealist and Materialist) – our geometric beliefs: their acquisition, truth and warrant. I present a difficulty attending the attempt to explain our acquisition of geometric beliefs, and consider two suggestions for contending with it. My conc... see more

In this chapter, I discuss the second metaphysical implication of the Idealist reading, pertaining to causation. Spatial contiguity seems to be one of the three conditions Hume discerns for causation in his analysis of the concept. Furthermore, Hume thinks causes precede their effects. This means, f... see more

In this chapter, I discuss the first implication of the Idealist reading, pertaining to the (dis)unity of space. I consider both the spatial relatedness of bodies existing at any one time and of bodies existing at different times. My conclusion is that Idealist space is both synchronically and diach... see more

In this chapter, I discuss the third metaphysical implication of the Idealist reading, pertaining to the divisibility of space. Is space infinitely or merely finitely divisible? I rebut Hume’s argument for the latter possibility, showing that it is invalid on both readings – the Materialist and the ... see more

The aim of this chapter is to argue that on the Materialist reading, Hume (of the first book of the Treatise) is significantly less of an empiricist than he is on the Idealist reading, and that on several interpretations of his methodological view, the Materialist reading renders his intellectual co... see more

My aim in this (final) chapter is to consider how the replacement of induction and the principles of constancy and coherence by IBE affects the epistemic status of beliefs acquired ampliatively (non-deductively), and to discern ways in which it renders Materialism and the explanationist version of H... see more

I have two aims in this chapter. I will argue, first, that Hume’s accounts of the aetiology of the vulgar and the philosophical beliefs about “bodies” are both inadequate. Second, I will develop a much more satisfactory account, at which Hume himself hints, based on the same idea I developed in Chap... see more

In the last four chapters, I consider the way the two readings, Idealist and Materialist, impact scepticism. In this chapter, I argue that Materialism is more Sceptical than Idealism in Hume’s System. In the following chapters, I will focus on the impact the two readings have on scepticism within a ... see more

In this chapter, I argue that the correct description of the way we generalise from experience has us inferring to the best explanation rather than, as Hume has it, inferring causally (inductively). This prepares the way to my argument, in the following chapters, in support of the claim that the two... see more

In the introduction, I describe the three related aims of the book. The first is to defend the Idealist interpretation of the belief in external objects (“bodies”) Hume ascribes to us in the Treatise against the Materialist interpretation often ascribed to him. The second is to discern some of the f... see more