Believing the Self-Contradictory

American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):279 - 285 (1982)
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Abstract

Clearly, if a man holds a self-contradictory belief, then his belief cannot be rational, for there can be no set of evidence sufficient to justify it. This is most apparent when the self contradictory belief is a belief in a conjunction, , rather than when it is a non-conjunctive self-contradictory belief, e.g. a belief that red is not a color

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John N. Williams
Singapore Management University

Citations of this work

On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.
Moorean absurdities and the nature of assertion.John N. Williams - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):135 – 149.
The preface paradox dissolved.John N. Williams - 1987 - Theoria 53 (2-3):121-140.

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